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Adequacy of Disclosure of Restrictions on
Flipping IPO Securities
Royce de R. Barondes"
Over$40 billion were raisedin initialpublic offerings (IPOs)during1998. Stock sold in
an IPO, on average,quickly tradessignificantly above its initialofferingprice,providingquick
gains to the initialpurchasers. Investment banks that underwriteIPOsare taking a numberof
actions to discouragepurchasersof stock in IPOs fom quickly reselling their stock; called
'flipping."Some underwritershave refused to permit those who flip stockpurchasedin an 1PO
to purchase in subsequentIPOs. These penaltiesforflipping,however,are imposed selectivey,
with favored customers notpunished (orpunished less severely), and with different brokerage
firms requiringdifering holding periods to avoid the adverse consequences. This Article
examines the implicationsofthis practice under the disclosure obligations imposed by federal
securitieslaws and concludes that the current disclosure is materially misleadingparticularly
in light of the failure to disclose the selective application of the penalties. Moreover, the
selective applicationofthe penalties casts significantdoubt on whether these offerings can be
considered 'fixed price" offerings, which would mean that cursory disclosure of the practice
would not suffice.
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Large sums are annually raised in initial public offerings (IPOs).
Sales of securities inIPOs in 1998 alone were nearly $44 billion.' On
average, stock sold in an IPO shortly thereafter trades at about a fifteen
percent premium from the IPO price.2 Recent trading in stock of
Intemet-related firms has been particularly volatile
The prospects for a material short-term return creates great
interest in purchasing stock sold in an IPO. As suggested by the
average short-term return, the demand for stock sold in an IPO at the
initial public offering price frequently exceeds the number of shares
offered.' Underwriters participating in the distribution of stock in an
IPO therefore need to ration the shares to prioritize investors who have
previously expressed indications of interest. Issuers create lists of
acquaintances of management to whom the underwriters give priority.'
Underwriters participating in an 20,in a practice called "spinning,"
also may grant priority to investors in a position to influence the extent
to which the underwriters receive future business.'
Some investors who purchase stock in an IPO quickly resell the
stock, known as "flipping," to realize the short-term gains.7 Flipping
1.
See Brian Garrity, Despite Hyper-Volatility, US. Stock Underwriting Drew
Nearly Even with '97,INvEsmENT DEALERS' DIG., Jan. 11, 1999, at 19, 19.
2.
See, e.g., Janet Cooper Alexander, The Lawsuit Avoidance Theory of Why Initial
Public Offerings Are Underpriced,41 UCLA L. REv. 17, 18 (1993) (describing a 16.09%
average profit from 1980 to 1987); see also Laurie Krigman et al., The PersistenceoflPO
Mispricingand the PredictivePowerof Flipping,54 J. FiN. 1015, 1020 tbl.1 (1999) (noting a
sample of large IPOs from 1988 to 1995 had average first-day returns of 12.3%); Jonathan A.
Shayne & Larry D. Soderquist, Inefficiency in the Market for Initial Public Offerings, 48
VAND. L. REv. 965, 970-71 (1995) (describing a sampling from 1975 to 1984 that showed an
average 10.9% initial return); Clifford W. Smith, Jr., Investment Banking and the Capital
AcquisitionProcess, 15 J. FIN. EcON. 3, 20 tbl.5, 21 (1986) (collecting evidence from various
studies, with a lowest sample average of 11.4%, and stating, "[Ihe average underpricing
appears to exceed 15 percent.'). A portion of the IPOs consummated annually involves
issuers, such as firms having no prior business operations, that are unlikely to have significant
first-day returns, which are excluded from the discussion in this Article.
3.
See Dunstan Prial, IPO Outlook- Balance of PowerShifts in Market on Surge in
Retail Investors, WALL ST. J., Dec. 7, 1998, at B7A ("New Internet stocks now are all but
expected to triple in value ....Anything less is reason to sell.").
4.
See supra note 2.
5.
See Mark Liebovich, Issue a Hot New Stock, and the World Is Your Friend,INT'L
HERALD TRIn., June 8, 1999, at I (discussing "friends and family" lists, which are lists of
personal acquaintances of employees of the issuer given preferred access to purchase in
IPOs).
6.
See I THOMAS LEE HAzEN, TRFATSE ON THE LAW OF SEcuRmis REGULATION
§ 6.2, at 97 (practitioner's ed., 3d ed. Supp. 1999). Spinning may be inconsistent with the
rules of the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD). See 1 id.
7.
See ALLAN H. PESSnq & JOSEPH A. Ross, THE COMPLETE WORDS OF WALL
STRE: THE PROF SSIONAL'S GuiDE TO INvESmENT LnEmAcv 270 (1991) (defining a
"flipper"); Shayne & Soderquist, supra note 2, at 976. Contexts in which the original retail
sales price of property is below the equilibrium price are not confined to the offering of stock
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stock acquired in an IPO, if done before the initial distribution of the
IPO is complete, can adversely affect that initial distribution by
providing an alternative source of the stock.' To the extent stock in an
IPO is priced below the equilibrium price in order to assure that the
underwriters will be able to resell the stock at the IPO price,9 flipping
increases the risk that the underwriters will be unable to resell all the
stock, producing a "sticky" offering.'"
Underwriters have developed tools to discourage flipping of
stock purchased in an IPO. A typical IPO is offered in a fixed price,
firm commitment offering."
In such an offering, a group of
underwriters, called the underwriting syndicate, purchases the
securities from the issuer (and any selling shareholders) and resells
them to the public.' The investment bank organizing and managing
the syndicate is called the "managing underwriter."13 The terms of the
agreement among the underwriters for an IPO may allow the
managing underwriter to recapture from broker-dealers who place
stock that is flipped fees otherwise earned by those broker-dealers in
respect of the securities flipped. 4 Those arrangements, which
encourage syndicate members to place securities with investors who
intend to hold the securities,"5 are called "penalty bids."' 6
in an IPO. See, e.g., Robert L. Simison, Beating the Wait List for the Hottest Wheels, WALL
ST. J., June 4, 1999, at WI (describing "car flipping," in which dealers who are seeking to
avoid censure from manufacturers for selling trendy cars above the suggested prices offer a
quick profit to those who purchase a vehicle and resell that vehicle, which has never left the
showroom, thus allowing the dealer to then sell the "preowned" vehicle at an even higher
price).
8.
See David B. Rea & William J. Grant, Jr., The Syndicatibn and Marketing
Process, in SEcuRmEs UNDERWRrriNG: A PRACTrIIONER'S GuIDE 277, 291 (Kenneth J.
Bialkin & William J. Grant, Jr. eds., 1985); cf Richard B. Carter & Frederick H. Dark,
UnderwriterReputation andInitial Public Offers: The DetrimentalEffects of Flippers, 28
FiN. REv. 279, 296 (1993) ("[Pjarticipation by flippers in an IPO offering is damaging to the
after-market price performance of that offering."); Krigman et al., supra note 2, at 1016-17
(citing market participants to this effect but stating that flipping represents a "rational
response").
9.
See infra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
10. See PassiN & Ross, supra note 7, at 685-86 (defining a "sticky deal" as "an
underwriting that will be difficult to market").
11. See Jay R. Ritter, The Costs of Going Public, 19 J. FiN. ECON. 269, 272 tbl.2
(1987) (citing data indicating that firm commitment contracts are used in most IPOs that raise
over $2 million). The discussion in this Article is limited to IPOs of significant size. Small
IPOs are more likely to be offered on a "best efforts" basis. See id.
12. See Order Approving Proposed Rule Change, Exchange Act Release No. 17,371,
45 Fed. Reg. 83,707, 83,709 (Dec. 12, 1980).
13. See PEssmn & Ross, supranote 7, at 407.
14. See Review of Antimanipulation Regulation of Securities Offerings, Securities
Act Release No. 7057,59 Fed. Reg. 21,681, 21,689-90 (Apr. 26, 1994).
15. See Trading Practices Rules Conceming Securities Offerings, Securities Act
Release No. 7282, 61 Fed. Reg. 17,108, 17,124-25 (Apr. 18, 1996) [hereinafter Trading
HeinOnline -- 74 Tul. L. Rev. 885 1999-2000
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The negative impact of penalty bids is not limited to the
adversely affected underwriters. The terms of the agreement between
the underwriter and its customer may impose an additional fee on
those who flip stock purchased in an IPO.1 7 It has been reported, for
example, that Wit Capital charges an additional five percent fee in
connection with any sale of securities purchased in an IPO made not
more than sixty days after the initial purchase.18 Additionally, the
investment bank may simply refuse to allocate to that customer
securities offered in subsequent IPOs.19
Of course, if no securities sold in IPOs were flipped, there would
be no immediate aftermarket trading in the securities, since there
generally is no other source for the securities that are sold in market
transactions. Yet a recent study found the median trading volume on
Practices Release]. "Enforcement of penalty bids typically continues for as long as 30 days."
Id. at 17,125. Since 1997, through a system developed by the Depository Trust Company,
managing underwriters have been able to identify the investment bank that placed stock
subsequently flipped. See Gregg Wirth, Syndicates Want IPO TRacking System Expanded,
INvEsrmENT DEALERs' DIG., Dec. 1, 1997, at 6, 7 (identifying a year-long trial period prior to
the commencement of full operations on June 2, 1997). See generally Order Approving a
Proposed Rule Change Implementing the Initial Public Offering Tracking System, Exchange
Act Release No. 37,208, 61 Fed. Reg. 25,253, 25,253 (May 13, 1996) (approving the
proposed rule change to allow implementation of an IPO tracking system). Prior to that time,
this tracking involved a more cumbersome process of tracing physical certificates. See id.
16. SEC rules define a "penalty bid" as "an arrangement that permits the managing
underwriter to reclaim a selling concession from a syndicate member in connection with an
offering when the securities originally sold by the syndicate member are purchased in
syndicate covering transactions." 17 C.F.R. § 242.100(b) (1999). This arrangement is
sometimes called a "penalty syndicate bid." See PEssrN & Ross, supranote 7, at 513.
An underwriting syndicate may sell more securities than are actually being offered,
obligating the managing underwriter to "cover" the "short position" with aftermarket
purchases. See Trading Practices Release, supra note 15, at 17,124. It is through this
mechanism that flipped securities could be purchased by the syndicate in a "covering"
transaction.
The practice of imposing penalty bids was introduced in the late 1980s. See Michael
Siconolfi & Patrick McGeehan, Wall Street Brokers Press Small Investors to Hold IPO
Shares, WALL ST. J., June 26, 1998, at Al; cf National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., Request
for Comments on Proposed Revisions to Schedule D of the NASD By-Laws, NASD Notice
to Members No. 86-55 (July 30, 1986), available in 1986 NASD LEXIS 376, at *39
(indicating that stabilizing bids entered in the NASDAQ system are to be identified as
penalty-free bids or penalty bids).
17. See Michael Siconolfi & Patrick McGeehan, Wall Street Boosts Penalty on 1PO
'Flips',WALL ST. J., July 31, 1998, at C1.
18. See id.
19. See, e.g., Michael Siconolfi, MassachusettsNears Pact in IPO Probe, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 3, 1998, at C1 ("Joseph Charles, in response to a subpoena, said in August it had 'an
informal corporate policy' that mandated if a broker's customers quickly sold their IPO
shares, they will be 'rendered ineligible' to buy future IPOs from the firm.'); Michael
Siconolfi, On-Line Firms Move to Quash IPO 'Flipping, WALL ST. J., Aug. 13, 1998, at Cl
(stating clients of Fidelity and Schwab who flip "risk being banned from future deals');
Siconolfi & McGeehan, supra note 17 (noting the similar policy of Wit Capital).
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the day of an IPO to be thirty-three percent of the number of shares
issued in the IPO.2 ° Thus, underwriters do not contemplate that no
IPO securities will be flipped. Rather, they seek to limit flipping,
particularly in circumstances in which it would adversely affect the
initial distribution of the securities.2 '
It has been reported that, in balancing these interests, investment
banks discriminate against individual investors.2
Favored
customers-institutional investors and certain prominent individual
purchasers-are less likely to be excluded from participating in future
IPOs as a consequence of flipping.' A 1998 article in The Wall Street
Journal, highlighting this discriminatory treatment of investors,
prompted 24an investigation of this practice by state securities
regulators.
Prospectuses for IPOs make some disclosure of these practices.
A typical disclosure is set forth in the following prospectus language,
which follows a discussion of stabilization: 25
The Underwriters ... may impose a penalty bid, whereby selling

concessions allowed to syndicate members or other broker-dealers in
respect of the securities sold in the offering for their account may be
reclaimed by the syndicate if such shares of Common Stock are
repurchased by the syndicate in stabilizing or covering transactions.
These activities may stabilize, maintain or otherwise affect the market
price of the Common Stock which may be higher than the price that
might otherwise prevail in the open market2 6 and these activities, if
commenced, may be discontinued at any time.
Notwithstanding the huge potential dollar impact of penalty bids,
the practice of implementing penalty bids and the cursory disclosure
currently provided, has received minimal attention in the legal
literature27 and has not yet been addressed by the courts.28 This Article
analyzes the adequacy of this disclosure under federal securities laws.
20. See Krigman et al., supranote 2, at 1026.
21. See Siconolfi & McGeehan, supranote 17.
22. See Siconolfi & McGeehan, supra note 16.
23. See, e.g., id. ("There's been a substantial amount of anecdotal information' about
the alleged discriminatory use of penalty bids, says Larry Bergmann, the SEC's senior
associate director of market regulation, but the agency doesn't yet have 'a clear view.").
. 24. See Michael Siconolfi, SEC Launches Probe into Efforts to Block Flipping of
IPOs in US., AsIAN WALL ST. J., Aug. 21, 1998, availablein 1998 WL-WSJA 12984804.
25. Stabilization is "the placing of any bid, or the effecting of any purchase, for the
purpose of pegging, fixing, or maintaining the price of a security." 17 C.F.R § 242.100(b)
(1999).
26. EBAY INc., PRospEcrus at U-2 (Sept 24, 1998), available in LEXIS, Fedsec
Library, Prosp File.
27. Attorney Jonathan Shayne and Professor Larry Soderquist have suggested, in a
conclusory fashion, that the practice could be manipulative in violation of federal securities
HeinOnline -- 74 Tul. L. Rev. 887 1999-2000
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The rules governing disclosure required in public offerings are
bifurcated. There'is a general obligation to disclose in the offering
document for an IPO all material information. That obligation is most
prominently set forth in sections 11 and 12 of the Securities Act of
1933 (1933 Act).29 Sections 11 and 12 respectively provide remedies
against (1) certain persons associated with the sale of securities by
means of a registration statement that "contained an untrue statement
of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact required to be
stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not
misleading,"3 and (2) one who offers or sells securities using a
prospectus, or with an oral statement, that "includes an untrue
statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary
in order to make the statements, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading (the purchaser not knowing of
' In addition to these general duties not to
such untruth or omission)."31
sell securities by means of false or misleading offering documents, the
SEC has promulgated specific rules identifying items that are required
to be included in registration statements." Liability may be imposed if
the prospectus omits a fact necessary to make the prospectus not
laws and argue, prior to the relevant amendments to Regulation S-K, see infra notes 34-36
and accompanying text, that the SEC should require "the use ... [to] be disclosed." See
Shayne & Soderquist, supra note 2, at 983-84. Additionally, another law review article
briefly discussed the current requirement to disclose penalty bids when the current rules were
in the proposal stage. See Daniel A. Braverman, U.S. Legal ConsiderationsAffecting Global
Offerings ofShares in ForeignCompanies, 17 J. INT'L L. & Bus. 30, 62 (1996).
28. The closest authority seems to be the settlement of a state administrative
proceeding alleging, in addition to more serious charges, a disclosure violation on this basis.
See Rachel Witmer, Mass. Securities Division Charges Fraud Against Firm, Manager,
Broker over Flipping,30 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1257 (Aug. 21, 1998). In August 1998,
the Massachusetts Securities Division initiated proceedings against Joseph Charles &
Associates, Inc., a broker-dealer, for various unlawful practices. See id. The allegedly
wrongful conduct included failing to disclose a policy of refusing to sell IPO securities to
investors who had previously flipped IPO securities, in addition to the more serious claims
that the broker refused to allow investors to sell securities purchased in an IPO and made
false or misleading statements to convince investors not to sell those securities. See id. In a
subsequent settlement, Joseph Charles agreed to withdraw from the Massachusetts market
and to pay a fine, without admitting or denying the charges. See Martha Kessler, Firm
Agrees to Two-Year Withdrawalfrom Mass., Fine over IPO FlippingPolicy, 31 Sec. Reg. &
L. Rep. (BNA) 31 (Jan. 8, 1999).
29. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k-771 (1994 & Supp. 1111997).
30. Id. § 77k(a) (1994).
31. Id. § 771(a)(2) (Supp. III 1997). Paragraph (b) of section 12 was added in 1995.
See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 105, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat.
737, 757 (1995) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77). As part of that amendment former sections
12(l) and 12(2) of the 1933 Act were redesignated as sections 12(a)(1) and 12(a)(2),
respectively. See id. For consistency, references in this Article to paragraphs of section 12 of
the 1933 Act prior to that amendment have been revised to reflect the current designations.
32. See 17 C.ER pts. 228,229(1999).
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misleading, even if the registration statement and the corresponding
prospectus include all the items specifically called for by the form on
which the offering has been registered.33
In late 1996, effective early 1997, the SEC adopted rules
expressly requiring the disclosure of penalty bids.34 Those rules now
require that prospectuses for registered offerings of securities describe
"information on stabilizing transactions, syndicate short covering
transactions, penalty bids, or any other transaction that affects the
offered security's price."' Prospectuses must "[d]escribe the nature of
the transactions clearly and explain how the transactions affect the
offered security's price."' It is in response to these requirements that
the sample disclosure set forth above was used.37

This illustrative disclosure addresses the adverse impact on an
underwriter of a subsequent flip of stock that the underwriter placed.
This typical disclosure presents some information that a prospective
purchaser might find material. The disclosure provides information
indirectly bearing on the aftermarket performance of the stock,
although the information is not necessarily adverse to one who
purchases in an IPO. It suggests an increased likelihood that the stock
will be placed in the hands of purchasers who will not quickly resell
the stock. If those purchasing stock in an IPO are generally less
willing to resell the stock promptly, there would be decreased
availability of the stock immediately following the offering. That fct
indicates an increased likelihood that prices immediately following the
IPO may rise.
Nevertheless, this form of disclosure does not identify issues of
more immediate concern to the initial purchaser in an IPO. The
33. See id. § 230.408 ("In addition to the information expressly required to be
included in a registration statement, there shall be added such further material information, if
any, as may be necessary to make the required statements, in the light of the circumstances
under which they are made, not misleading."); id. § 240.12b-20 (same, as to a "statement" or
"report"); see also Degulis v. LXR Biotech., Inc., 928 F Supp. 1301, 1314 (S.D.N.Y 1996)
("[No authority suggests that Regulation S-K is preemptive of the materiality
requirement"); cf.Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1209 (Ist Cir. 1996) (rejecting
the argument that "disclosure requirements of the Securities Act and regulations, including
Item 11(a) of Form S-3, should be interpreted so that they would never mandate the provision
of current information about a company's performance in the quarter in progress at the time
of a public offering, so long as the company satisfies its quarterly and annual periodic
disclosure obligations under the Exchange Act').
34. See Anti-Manipulation Rules Conceming Securities Offerings, Securities Act
Release No. 7375, 62 Fed. Reg. 520, 543 (Jan. 3, 1997) (adding 17 C.F.R. §§ 228.508(j),
229.508(0).
35. 17 C.F.R. §§ 228.5080)(1), 229.508(0(1) (1999).
36. Id.
37. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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disclosure is entirely silent concerning certain direct, adverse
consequences to the purchaser itself-that the broker will or may, in
the future, refuse to sell stock in an IPO to the purchaser. This Article
argues that this omission is inconsistent with the federal securities
laws.
A careful examination of the legal principles governing flipping
securities purchased in IPOs should incorporate and reflect market
factors that create incentives to flip those securities. Part I provides
that background by discussing theories rationalizing the extraordinary
short-term returns available to those who purchase stock in IPOs. Part
I further discusses recent developments in the marketing of IPOs that
may, in the future, partially mitigate flipping in some IPOs.
Parts II and III examine the application of federal securities laws
to the failure to disclose in prospectuses these restrictions on flipping.
Whether these omissions are permissible depends in large measure on
whether the restrictions are "material," as that term is used in the
federal securities laws.38 Part II examines three general principles
governing materiality relevant in this context: First, there is some
authority to the effect that materiality is limited to information that is
'
"firm-specific."39
Because restrictions on flipping are imposed by
persons other than the issuer and they are widespread within the IPO
market, that authority, if applicable, could eliminate liability for the
omission. Part II examines the authority holding that materiality is
limited to firm-specific information. Part II concludes that authority is
inconsistent with other longstanding authority and, in any case, is
based on assumptions not applicable to IPOs. Second, Part II
discusses the insight that can be provided into materiality by an
examination of the reasons for the incomplete or inaccurate disclosure.
Third, Part II examines whether quantification of the impact of a
misstatement or omission is a precondition to a finding of materiality,
concluding there is no such precondition.
Part III then applies the principles developed in Part II to the
context of a failure to disclose restrictions on flipping. As noted in
Part II, materiality is generally a question of fact for the jury4 The
examination in Part I indicates that there is sufficient evidence to
allow a jury to determine that a failure to disclose these restrictions is
material and therefore actionable. Part III further examines the
discriminatory application of these restrictions. Part I, relying on
38. See 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2) (1994); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1999); infra notes 8497 and accompanying text.
39. See discussion infra Part ll.A.
40. See infra text accompanying note 95.

HeinOnline -- 74 Tul. L. Rev. 890 1999-2000

2000]

FLIPPINGIPOSECURITIES

National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) rules and case law,
closes by arguing the discriminatory application of these restrictions
makes offering documents misleading as a matter of law, by creating a
false impression that the offering is a "fixed price" offering.
Following Part III, some concluding remarks are provided.
I.

TRADING IMaI'VEDIATELY

FOLLOWING AN IPO

The average initial rate of return available on IPOs is
substantial.4 In general, finance theorists view the stock market (at
least when one excludes the "penny stock" market) as efficient, in the
sense ofpromptly reflecting all publicly available information."
That does not mean the expected return on all stock should be the
same. Stock having a nondiversifiable risk greater than that of the
market should have a rate of return greater than that of the market as a
whole.43 However, under that theory, one would expect arbitrage
generally to prevent an investor from earning above-market returns,
holding risk constant and absent possession of nonpublic information.
This view, however, is not inconsistent with being able to earn abovemarket returns, holding risk constant, by purchasing stock in an IPO.4
There are a number of theories addressing the reasons why there
is a large average increase in the price of stock immediately following
an IPO. Under one prominent theory, this run-up reflects an
intentional underpricing of the stock.4" This theory assumes that,
although an issuer may have unique information concerning its future
profitability, investors are "asymmetrically well informed about factors
' The theory postulates that stock sold in an
outside the issuing firm. 46
IPO is intentionally underpriced in order to provide some
compensation to those who purchase stock in the IPO for revealing the

41. See supranote 2 and accompanying text.
42. See Baruch Lev & Meiring de Villiers, Stock PriceCrashesand 10b-5 Damages:
A Legal, Economic, and Policy Analysis, 47 STAN. L. RPv. 7, 21 n.68 (1994) ("This
proposition has been called the 'semi-strong' version of market efficiency. According to this
version, investors not orily react quickly to new information, they also react in an unbiased
manner-that is, they do not make systematic mistakes in interpreting the information. The
semi-strong version of market efficiency is widely accepted by financial economists."
(citation omitted)); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Finance,BadEconomics:
An Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-MarketTheory, 42 STAN. L. REV.1059, 1081-82 (1990).

43. Cf STHEN A. Ross ET AL, FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATE FNANCE 315
tbl.10.3 (1991) (noting varying risk premiums for common stocks and "small stocks").
44. See infra note 206 and accompanying text.
45. See Lawrence M. Benveniste & Paul A. Spindt, How Investment Bankers
Determinethe OfferPriceandAllocation ofNewIssues, 24 J. FIN. EcON. 343,344 (1989).
46. Id.
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information bearing on valuation. 47 Thus, under this theory, the
reflects' a method by which this consideration is
underpricing
48
provided.
The nature of a fixed price offering limits the ability of an issuer
to use this mechanism to compensate those investors who provide the
Access to certain financial information
desired information.
fundamental to making an accurate assessment of the value of stock to
be sold in an IPO-projections-is not given to all investors.4 9 Issuers
historically have omitted projections from offering documents for
IPOs but disseminated that information (although not in tangible form)
at "road shows," to which not all investors are invited, or through
selective conversations with the underwriters' salesmen.50 Moreover,
possession of projections, by itself, is insufficient to permit one to
47. See id.
48. There are various alternative, or complementary, theories. For example, the
excess return may reflect a "lemons" problem. See Kevin Rock, Why New Issues Are
Underpriced, 15 J. FiN. ECON. 187, 188 (1986). Where some but not all investors are
informed and purchases by both informed and uninformed investors are necessary to
consummate the offering, the issuer may need to underprice the offering to entice uninformed
bidders to purchase. See id. Otherwise, the uninformed purchasers may receive large
allocations in overpriced offerings and small or no allocations in underpriced offerings. See
id. However, this model incorporates a curious assumption. The model assumes that the
issuer is "uninformed" relative to a set of investors who are assumed to be informed,
putatively because, inter alia, "the firm gives up its informational advantage by revealing its
proprietary knowledge to the market The firm discloses 'material information' about its
plans and activities directly through the prospectus." Id. at 190. Crucial information is not
required to be, and generally is not, included in the prospectus-projections. Although
prospective investors will learn something about the projections at the road show, the issuer
will necessarily remain better informed concerning the propriety of crucial assumptions and
the sensitivity of the projections to the various assumptions. The underlying assumptionthat uninformed investors are allocated materially higher percentages of overpriced IPOsalso has been empirically called into question. See Kathleen Weiss Hanley & William J.
Wilhelm, Jr., Evidence on the Strategic Allocation of Initial Public Offerings, 37 J. FIN.
ECON. 239,247,252 (1995).
Alternatively, the underpricing may reflect the equivalent of "insurance" against future
lawsuits, by decreasing the likelihood that a lawsuit will be filed and limiting future damages.
See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 2, at 19, 25 (criticizing that theory).
49. The importance of projections is illustrated by the fact that large institutional
investors insist on the provision of projections. See CHARLES J. JOHNSON, JR. & JOSEPH
MCLAUGHLIN, CORPORATE FINANCE AND THE SECUmRES LAWS

133 (2d ed. 1997).

The SEC recently proposed rules that would limit issuers' ability to disclose material
nonpublic information selectively. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities
Act Release No. 7787, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590 (Dec. 28, 1999). Under the proposal, where an
issuer discloses material nonpublic information to any person who does not owe "a duty of
trust or confidence" to the issuer, the issuer will be required to disclose the information
publicly. See id. at 72,610-11. However, this obligation would not, under the proposed rule,
apply to an issuer in the process of marketing its IPO. See id. at 72,598.
50. See JOHNSON & MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 49, at 133. As an administrative
matter, it may well be that the projections are disseminated indirectly, through the employees
of the managing underwriter. See id.at 134.
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derive an estimate of value. This determination requires that one also
have comparable revenue and stock price information for similar
alternative investments."' Even where that information is public,
obtaining and processing it can involve insurmountable costs for
individual investors. An individual investor would be required to
identify comparable firms and make appropriate adjustments for
material differences such as different accounting conventions. Based
on these and similar reasons, there are certainly some prospective
investors who determine to purchase stock in an IPO without making a
thorough investigation of the information available to prospective
purchasers.52
Two sets of investors-those not competent or willing to make
an analysis of the value of the firm and those competent to do so but
who lack crucial information-do not provide the issuer and its
underwriters the same information that can be provided by other, more
informed investors. Nevertheless, in a traditional fixed price, firm
commitment IPO, the issuer (or, perhaps more accurately, the
underwriter) cannot charge varying prices.5 3 Thus, even if the
underpricing is atan appropriate market rate, a pro rata payment, in the
form of underpricing, also generally must be made to those who do not
provide the same level of information. Consequently, persons who
provide lesser information to the issuer can earn above-market, riskadjusted returns.
There are other theories bearing on this underpricing. One of the
factors that affects a corporation's decision to consummate an IPO is
an estimate of the price that will be realized on the stock to be sold.
Prospective issuers obtain estimates from the investment banks that
they choose to manage their offerings, and issuers consider differences
in estimates provided by various investment banks courting an issuer

51. See Abby M. Alderman & Kenneth Y Hao, The Initial Public Offering Process,
in How TO PREPARE AN INIAL PUBLIc OFFERiNG 1995, at 405, 411 (PLI Corporate Law &

Practice Course Handbook Series No. B-904, 1995); William J. Grant, Jr., Overview of the
UnderwritingProcess,in SEcURMES UNDERWRITING: A PRACITlONER'S GUIDE, supranote

8, at 25, 26-27 (describing the IPO pricing process); cf. Manuel A. Utset, Producing
Information: Initial PublicOfferings, Production Costs, and the ProducingLawyer, 74 OR.
L. REV. 275, 284 (1995) (suggesting that the value of an asset that has no market can be
ascertained by reference to the value of similar investments).
52. See Robert J. Shiller, Speculative Pricesand PopularModels, 4 J. ECON. PEnsP.
55, 61 (1990) (noting that individuals purchasing in IPOs are more likely to make a purchase
decision based on factors other than a "theory about fundamentals such as profits or
dividends').
53. Investment banks have a limited ability to evade this requirement through "soft
dollar" arrangements. See infra text accompanying note 315.
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in selecting the investment banks to manage their respective IPOs 4
As the IPO process proceeds, underwriters obtain indications of
interest from potential purchasers, which permit the managing
underwriter to revise the offering price to reflect actual demand for the
securities to be offered." However, economic evidence indicates that
underwriters only partially adjust their estimates. 6 The average initial
return for IPOs priced above initial estimates is greater than that of
IPOs as a whole; similarly, the average initial'retum for IPOs priced
below initial estimates is less than that of IPOs as a whole.5 7 This
process would also be consistent with the potential availability of
excess returns by purchasing stock sold in an IPO.58
An additional explanatory factor briefly sketched in prior legal
literature identifies a mechanism, relevant to newly developed
practices in pricing stock sold in IPOs, that can account for a portion
of the postoffering price increase. 9 In a customary IPO, the managing
underwriter, in negotiations with the issuer, prices the offering based
on indications of interest solicited from institutional investors and
other customers? ° The underwriters have strong incentives to
distribute the securities as quickly as possible after the offering has
commenced.6 ' Once the offering begins, in general, the underwriters
proportionately bear market risk-the risk that the entire market will
decline, which would decrease their ability to sell the securities at the
indicated price--as well as issuer-specific risk. The underwriting
agreement will provide for "market outs," conditioning the
54. See Alderman & Hao,supra note 51, at 411; Grant, supranote 51, at 26-27.
55. See Alderman & Hao,supra note 51, at 418-19.
56. See Kathleen Weiss Hanley, The Underpricingof initialPublic Offerings and the
PartialAdjustmentPhenomenon, 34 J. FIN. ECON. 231, 232 (1993).
57. See id. at 233-34.
58. See id.
59. See Alexander, supra note 2, at 69; Royce de R. Barondes, Dynamic Economic
Analyses of Selected Provisions of Corporate Law: The Absolute Delegation Rule,
Disclosure of Intermediate Estimates and IPO Pricing, 7 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 97, 136-39
(1994). Professor Jay Ritter also considers the implications of having informed and
uninformed investors. See Ritter, supra note 11, at 276-80. He, however, examines the effect
this bifurcation of the investing public has on the choice of an offering method. See id. He
argues that a "best efforts" offering, an atypical offering method, see supra note 11 and
accompanying text, in which the underwriters do not assume the risk that the offering cannot
be sold at the offering price, see PEssiN & Ross, supra note 7, at 60, will be used in
circumstances where the valuation of the issuer is more uncertain. See Ritter, supranote 11,
at 276-77. His argument is somewhat curious, because it requires that the uninformed
investor be sufficiently informed to distinguish among levels of uncertainty conceming an
appropriate value for the issuer's securities. See id.
60. See Barondes, supra note 59, at 137.
61. See id.
62. See id.
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underwriters' respective obligations to purchase on substantial adverse
developments in the markets as a whole, or the prospectus becoming
materially misleading as of the closing. 3 However, the underwriters
rarely exercise market outs-they are willing to do so only in truly
extreme cases-meaning that the underwriters generally bear a
substantial portion of the market risk.'M On the other hand, the
underwriters' upside profit is limited, in that they cannot lawfully
make additional profit by placing the stock with themselves and their
affiliates for immediate resale at a price above the IPO price.65 That
the underwriters have significant downside risk without corresponding
potential upside reward imposes incentives on the underwriters to sell
the offering as quickly as possible. Even hours can be important.66
This fact creates incentives for the underwriters to sell securities in
large blocks-generally to institutional purchasers. Investment banks
thus may (1) discount retail demand for stock to be sold in an IPO
because the distribution will be primarily institutional and (2) reflect in
the pricing a downward bias to assure that the offering does not
become "sticky." 7 Consistent with these incentives, institutional
purchasers typically acquire on the order of seventy percent of the
shares offered in an IPO, with retail purchasers receiving the
remainder.68 This general outcome-that underpricing may reflect the
underwriters' desire to assure that the offering is sold, in light of
asymmetry in risk-is identified by Professors John Affleck-Graves
and Robert Miller69 and by Professor Janet Cooper Alexander." To
63. See 1 Louis Loss & JOEL SELiMAN,
(3d ed. 1998).

SEcURrrmEs REGULATION

331, 332 & n.17

64.
65.

See lid.at331-32.
Such an action would violate the "withholding" rules of the NASD. See
NATIONAL ASS'N OF SEc. DEALERS, INc., CoNDucr RuLEs IM-2110-1(b), in N.A.S.D.
Manual (CCH) 4112-4115 (1997) [hereinafter NASD MANuAL].
66. Consistent with this notion, in an offering not under Rule 430A, 17 C.FR.

§ 230.430A (1999), the underwriters typically will not be bound prior to the effectiveness of
the registration statement See John S. D'Alimonte & Linda G. Schechter, Underwriting
Documents: TheirPurposeand Content, in MEcHANcS OF UNDERwRiNG 1995, at 213, 257
(PLI Corporate Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. B-879, 1995). The
underwriters desire not to assume the risk of a few-hour delay in their ability to sell the
securities that could arise were administrative reasons to postpone slightly the effectiveness
of the registration statement in such a context
67. For discussion of a "sticky deal," see supra note 10 and accompanying text.
68. See Hanley & Wilhelm, supra note 48, at 240.
69. See John Affleck-Graves & Robert E. Miller, Regulatory and ProceduralEffects
on the UnderpricingoflnitialPublic Offerings, 12 J. FIN. Rns. 193, 199 (1989).
70. See Alexander, supra note 2, at 69 ("[U]nderwriters underprice not to avoid
distant and speculative future losses from lawsuits under the securities laws, but to avoid the
more immediate and certain costs of having to stabilize the market price, being stuck with
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the extent this factor accounts for the postoffering price run-up, two
recent developments in the method by which IPOs are sold may
significantly decrease the postoffering run-up in IPO prices that
otherwise could occur.
An underwriter could incorporate individual investor demand in
determining an IPO price if the underwriter could obtain, before
pricing, binding commitments from individual investors. One solution
could be a binding "at the market" offer from the investor, in which the
retail investor would agree to purchase at whatever price the
underwriters selected. An underwriter could seek to achieve the same
result by soliciting revocable offers to purchase. Offers to buy may be
made prior to the effectiveness of a filed registration statement.7" An
underwriter could seek offers specifying a maximum price. Because
the underwriter can control dissemination of the actual price chosen,
such offers would have the same effect as binding offers, where the
offers could be accepted without prior dissemination of the actual offer
price. Alternatively, the underwriter could price the securities through
a "Dutch auction."72
Although Dutch auctions have been used in certain debt
offerings, for a variety of reasons neither of these methods has been
traditionally used in selling IPOs.73 However, two investment banks,
W.. Hambrecht & Company and Wit Capital, have each started
incorporating these practices in offerings of IPOs. The first was W.R.
Hambrecht & Company, a newly formed investment bank, which
conducts a quasi-Dutch auction for IPOs. The process created by
W.R.Hambrecht & Co. is referenced here as a quasi-Dutch auction,
because the outcome of the Dutch auction procedure is not binding on
either the issuer7 4 or, it appears, the purchasers.7' Rather, the results of

unsold inventory, and suffering damage to their reputations among customers and other
underwriters.").
71. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (1994).
72. In a Dutch auction, as implemented in connection with a sale of securities, bids
by interested parties are placed specifying a quantity and a maximum price. The shares are
sold at an identical price equal to the highest price at which the aggregate bids for shares at or
above that price equals at least the number of shares to be sold. See Exxon Corp., SEC NoAction Letter, available in 1977 SEC No-Act LEXIS 1245, at *2 (May 9, 1977); PssIN &
Ross, supranote 7, at 216.
73. See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Angels on the Internet: The Elusive
Promise of "TechnologicalDisintermediation"for UnregisteredOfferings of Securities, 2 J.
SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 1, 13 (1998) (asserting that Dutch auctions are "promising" as a
mechanism to price securities for which there is no public market).
74. See RAVENSWOOD WINERY, INC., PROSPECTUS 57 (Apr. 9, 1999), available in
LEXIS, Fedsec Library, Prosp File.
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the processing of those indications of interest is considered in setting
the fixed public offering price.76

Most recently, procedures designed by Wit Capital, described in a
no-action letter released in July 1999, allow for conditional offers to
purchase that can be accepted without prior dissemination of the IPO
price." Under these procedures, investors, in advance of the pricing,
place "conditional orders."' The orders either specify a maximum
price the purchaser is willing to pay or include an implied maximum
consisting of the high end of the estimated offering range disclosed in
the prospectus. 79 After the offering is priced, Wit Capital allocates
shares to those investors who have bid at or above the actual offering
price, based on a modified "first come, first served" priority." The
prospective investors are free to withdraw bids before they are
accepted.8 It appears, however, that the investors are not informed of
the actual offering price before any acceptance of their bids.82 Thus,
although the investors are free to withdraw their conditional offers at
any time before acceptance, there is no mechanism by which they will
learn of the actual price until Wit Capital has determined whether to
accept their offer.
Both the W.R. Hambrecht and the Wit Capital methodologies
allow for greater incorporation of actual retail demand for IPO stock
when IPOs are priced. It is too early to tell whether these methods, or
other refinements, will be used successfully. But to the extent they are
used and the mechanism described by Professors Affleck-Graves and
Miller accounts for the postoffering ran-up, one would expect to see
the use of this offering methodology decreasing the short-term return
from purchasing stock in an IPO and perhaps partially mitigate the
concerns addressed by this Article. Confirmation, however, awaits
future empirical research."

75. The bids are referenced as mere "indications of interest," and the prospectus for
one of the offerings references "offering" stock to those who submit indications of interest at
or above the clearing price. See id. at 57-58.
76. See id.
77. See Wit Capital Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, available in 1999 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 620 (July 14, 1999).
78. See id. at *25.
79. See id. at *25-*26.
80. See id. at *34.
81. See id. at *29.
82. See id. at *34-*35 (indicating that the price is included in an "Acceptance Email").
83. That research may be complicated by a potential selection bias in the firms that
choose to make offerings through W.R. Hambrecht or Wit Capital.
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GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF MATERIALITY: FIRM-SPECIFIC

INFORMATION, REASONS FOR THE OMIssION, AND

QUANTIFICATION
Liability for misstatements or omissions under sections 11,

12(a)(2), and 17(a)(2)8 4 of the 1933 Act and Rule 1Ob-5 85 under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act) 86 is limited to material
misstatements or omissions.87 Any assessment of the adequacy of
disclosure typically provided in prospectuses for IPOs concerning the
consequences of flipping securities purchased thus must begin with an
understanding of "materiality" in the context of public offerings.
The seminal case concerning materiality under the federal
securities laws is TSC Industries,Inc. v. Northway,Inc.8" In that case,
the United States Supreme Court stated: "An omitted fact is material
if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would
consider it important in deciding how to vote.""9 TSC Industries
involved an allegedly actionable omission from a proxy statement
which is the reason the opinion references a decision to vote.0 In
other contexts, such as whether an offering document omits a material
fact, this same test, modified to reflect the different context," is

applied to assess materiality." Applying this standard in the context of
an omission concerning the purchase of a security, the omission need
not address a matter that, were it disclosed, would change the

84. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2) (1994).
85. 17 C.F.L § 240.10b-5 (1999).
86. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (1994 & Supp. I1 1997).
87. The SEC has recently taken the position, however, that under section 13 of the
1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1994), the intentional making of immaterial misstatements in
financial statements can be actionable. See SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, available
in 1999 SEC LEXIS 1599, at *22 (Aug. 12, 1999) [hereinafter Staff Accounting Bulletin No.

99].
88. 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
89. Id. at 449.
90. See id.
91. Where the fraud pertains to a purchase of a security, the reference to "deciding
how to vote" is changed to "contemplating the purchase of securities." See, e.g., Decker v.
Kraftsow (In re Craftmatic Sec. Litig.), 890 F.2d 628, 639 (3d Cir. 1990).
92. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232 (1988) (applying the test in the
context of Rule lOb-5); Decker, 890 F.2d at 641 n.18 ("Other courts have held that the
definition of materiality from 7SC Industries applies to actions under both § 11 and
§ 12[(a)(2)]."); Isquith v. Middle S. Utils., Inc., 847 F.2d 186, 207 n.16 (5th Cir. 1988)
(applying the test to section 11 claims); Kronfeld v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 832 F.2d 726,
731 (2d Cir. 1987) (applying the test to section 11); 4 Loss & SELGMA, supra note 63, at
2063 (3d ed. 1990 & Supp. 1999).
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purchaser's investment decision.93 It need only be "important" to a
"reasonable" investor in making the investment decision 4
Determination of the materiality of a misstatement or omission is
usually reserved for the trier of fact.95 Similarly, adequacy of
disclosure is a mixed question of fact and law, and therefore normally
left to the trier of fact.96 Nevertheless, in some contexts, the resolution
is so clear that courts have determined materiality as a matter of law.97
A.

Information That Is Not Issuer-Specific

The actions that are taken by underwriters to deter flipping are
not issuer-specific; these activities represent market practices not
peculiar to a particular issuer. Moreover, these actions are taken by the
underwriters and are not necessarily within the control of the issuers.
It is not clear whether issuers would be able to compel underwriters to
cease these practices were issuers inclined to pursue the issue.
Additionally, these practices are, in light of recent press reports, public
knowledge.98 These facts might be considered to eliminate any
obligation to disclose these practices in prospectuses. There certainly
is some authority that issuers are not required to disclose information
that is not issuer-specific. However, a thoughtful reading of relevant
precedent indicates that any obligation to disclose this information is
not terminated by the fact that the information is not issuer-specific or
is otherwise publicly available.
The court in Wielgos v. Commonwealth Edison Co. discussed the
liability of an issuer under section 11 of the 1933 Act for estimates,
93.
Sons, Inc.,
94.
95.
96.
97.

See TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 449; Quincy Co-Operative Bank v. A.G. Edwards &
655 F. Supp. 78, 85 (D. Mass. 1986).
See TSCIndus., 426 U.S. at 449-50.
See id. at 450.
See Duming v. First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1268 (9th Cir. 1987).
In TSC Industries,the Court stated:

The issue of materiality may be characterized as a mixed question of law
and fact, involving as it does the application of a legal standard to a particular set
of facts. In considering whether summary judgment on the issue is appropriate, we
must bear in mind that the underlying objective facts, which will often be free from

dispute, are merely the starting point for the ultimate determination of materiality.
The determination requires delicate assessments of the inferences a "reasonable
shareholder" would draw from a given set of facts and the significance of those
inferences to him, and these assessments are peculiarly ones for the trier of fact.
Only if the established omissions are "so obviously important to an investor, that
reasonable minds cannot differ on the question of materiality" is the ultimate issue

of materiality appropriately resolved "as a matter of law" by summary judgment.

TSCIndus., 426 U.S. at 450 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 422
F.2d 1124, 1129 (4th Cir. 1970)).
98. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
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incorporated by reference into a prospectus, to complete nuclear power
stations.99 In affirming summary judgment in favor of the issuer on
the claim that the estimates were actionable for underestimating the
costs, the court said:
Issuers need not "disclose" Murphy's Law or the Peter Principle, even
though these have substantial effects on business. So too issuers need
not estimate the chance that a federal agency will change its rules or
tighten up on enforcement. Securities laws require issuers to disclose
firm-specific information; investors and analysts combine that
information with knowledge about the competition, regulatory
conditions, and the economy as a whole to produce a value for stock.
Just as a firm needn't disclose that 50% of all new products vanish from
the market within a short time, so [the issuer] needn't disclose the
hazards of its business, hazards apparent to all serious observers and
most casual ones."°0
The court further noted, in discussing December 1982 estimates of
costs to complete the stations, which were incorporated by reference
into prospectuses for an offering in December 1983:
It was no secret that the estimate prepared in December 1982 was
too low. The firm said so in September 1983. Proceedings in the
[Atomic Safety and Licensing Board], including the staff's demand for
re-inspections of [a reactor's] plumbing-costly to perform, costly
because of delay-were public knowledge. The market price of the
firm's stock, which [the plaintiff] and his class paid in the shelf offering,
99. 892 F.2d 509, 510 (7th Cir. 1989).
100. Id. at 515 (citation omitted). The Supreme Court's opinion in 2SC Industries
may in part be to blame for this view. The Court, after setting forth the definition of
materiality quoted above, see supratext accompanying note 89, stated:
What the standard does contemplate is a showing of a substantial likelihood that,
under all the circumstances, the omitted fact would have assumed actual
significance in the deliberations of the reasonable shareholder. Put another way,
there must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would
have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the
"total mix" of information made available.
TSCIndus., 426 U.S. at 449. In the context of a public offering, the reference to "total mix"
can be read to reference all public information, as opposed to the total mix of information in
the prospectus. The Supreme Court has indicated that the reference to the "total mix" allows
companies not to disclose information that would be "essentially useless." See Basic Inc. v.
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 234 (1988) ("The role of the materiality requirement is not to
'attribute to investors a child-like simplicity, an inability to grasp the probabilistic
significance of negotiations,' but to filter out essentiallyuseless information that a reasonable
investor would not consider significant, even as part of a larger 'mix' of factors to consider in
making his investment decision." (citation omitted) (emphasis added) (quoting Flamm v.
Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169, 1175 (7th Cir. 1987))). For the reasons expressed infra notes 124201 and accompanying text, the better reading understands the reference to be to the
information in the prospectus.
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reflected this information. Prompt incorporation of news into stock
price is the foundation for the fraud-on-the-market doctrine and
therefore supports a truth-on-the-market doctrine as well. Knowledge
abroad in the market moderated, likely eliminated, the potential of a
dated projection
to mislead. It therefore cannot be the basis of
10
liability.
This position-that firms need to disclose, or should be required
only to disclose, finn-specific information-has been reiterated in a
number of cases and by commentators.10'2 A review of cases illustrates
that this proposition
has been extended to contexts beyond inaccurate
3

projections.1
ndustry trends represent one form of information relevant to an
investment decision that is not issuer-specific.
In re F&M
Distributors,Inc. Securities Litigation involved the failure to disclose

in a prospectus an industry trend that had already appeared and was

continuing at the time the prospectus was issued.'" The issuer sold
health and beauty aids and household supplies at discount prices."°5
Historically, the issuer had used "deal" buying (i.e., purchases at times
101. Wielgos, 892F.2d at516 (citations omitted).
102. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi, Company Registration: Toward a Status-Based
Antifraud Regime, 64 U. C. L. REv. 567, 594 (1997) ("Issuers ... should face a duty only

to disclose firm-specific information that is necessary for the market to interpret intelligibly
the forward-looking statements and that the market does not already possess."); Edmund W.
Kitch, The Theory and PracticeofSecuritiesDisclosure,61 BROOK. L. REv. 763, 775 (1995)

("[S]ince the process of disclosing information is costly to the issuer, the issuer's obligation
to disclose should be focused on the information as to which it does have a comparative
advantage-value-relevant information about the issuer's own business."); cf. Henry T.C.
Hu, illiteracyand Intervention: WholesaleDerivatives, RetailMutual Funds,and the Matter

ofAsset Class, 84 GEo. L.J. 2319, 2322 (1996) ("Under the traditional disclosure paradigm,
an entity subject to mandatory disclosure is required to focus on information about itself and
its securities, focusing on what can be referred to loosely as 'firm specific' information.
Non-firm specific information, such as publicly available information about the history or
prospects of the industry the entity happens to be in, is secondary." (footnote omitted)). But
see Lawrence A. Cunningham, "Firm-Specific" Information and the Federal Securities
Laws: A Doctrinal,Etymological, and Theoretical Critique, 68 TUL. L. REv. 1409, 1411

(1994) ("[Tjhis Article embraces the more immediate goal of arresting the spread of the line
of cases embracing the firm-specific approach, which is deeply infected by doctrinal and
etymological flaws."); Thomas Lee Hazen, Rational Investments, Speculation, or
Gambling?-DerivativeSecuritiesand FinancialFuturesand Their Effect on the Underlying
Capital Markets, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 987, 1025-26 (1992) (describing Wielgos as having

"unfortunate" implications).
103. Cases involving projections present special issues. Where a lawsuit alleges that
projections were actionable, in light of the fact that the projections proved inaccurate, the
lawsuit necessarily concems the basis for the projections. Even information that otherwise
need not be disclosed could become relevant in light of the assumptions made in preparing
the projections.
104. 937 F. Supp. 647,650 (E.D. Mich. 1996).
105. See id. at 649.
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of the year when manufacturers offered large-volume discounts) and
"contract" buying (i.e., purchases providing consistently low prices
based on volume) to realize low inventory costs, which allowed it to
underprice its competitors.! 6 As of the date of the prospectus, within
the relevant industry as a whole, there allegedly was an inadequately
disclosed decline in the availability of deal buying. 7 The court, in
considering a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, referenced "the rule which
proscribes that publicized industry trends need not be disclosed."10 8
A similar assessment is presented in Phillips v. Kidder,Peabody
& Co. 9 In a discussion of potential liability under sections 11 and
12(a)(2) of the 1933 Act for incomplete disclosure of adverse industry
trends, the court stated: "Even if the Prospectus had not explicitly
revealed the conditions in the industry, however, the defendant could
not have been held liable for such an omission[] because ... it had no
duty to report readily available industry trends."' 10
General economic data, although not issuer-specific, can be
relevant to an investment decision. That type of information was at
issue in Hershey v. MNC Financial,Inc."' The plaintiffs were persons
who had purchased the issuer's stock during certain periods, including
persons who had acquired the stock, registered pursuant to a
registration statement, in a merger."' The plaintiffs alleged, inter alia,
violations of Rule lOb-5 and sections 11 and 12."1 One deficiency
pertained to a favorable statement in periodic reporting, incorporated
by reference into the registration statement, concerning the strength of
the economy in the area where the issuer, a bank holding company,
made a large portion of its loans." 4 The court stated:
Some of these misrepresentations [identified by the plaintiffs] may not
be actionable as a matter of law. For example, statements to the effect
that the Baltimore/Washington regional economy is strong are not
"firm-specific" and pertain to a matter as to which a potential investor

106. Seeid. at649-50.
107. See id. at 652.
108. Id. at 654. This portion of the court's opinion examines the applicability of Rule
lOb-5. See id. at 652-55. It does not clarify the extent to which this analysis applies to
actions under section 11 or 12 of the 1933 Act.
109. 933 F. Supp. 303,321 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd, 108 F.3d 1370 (2d Cir. 1997).

110. Id.
111.
112.
113.
114.

774F. Supp. 367,372(D. Md. 1991).
See id. at 368, 371-72.
Seeid. at372, 374.
See id. at 369-70,372.
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could reach
an independent judgment after consulting with his financial
115

advisor.
In re RAC MortgageInvestment Corp. Securities Litigation also
involved disclosure concerning general economic data-in that case,
in connection with two stock offerings by a real estate investment trust
that profited by issuing collateralized mortgage obligations and
retaining the residuals." 6 One of the allegedly actionable violations
was the failure to disclose in the prospectuses that long-term interest
rates could fall contemporaneous with an increase in short-term
interest rates. 7 Both those events could adversely affect the value of
the residuals retained by the issuer and, therefore, the value of the
issuer's stock.1 The court, relying on Wielgos, held that this nonfirm-specific information concerning possible changes in the form of
the yield curve need not have been disclosed in the prospectus. 19
F&M Distributors,Phillips, and Hershey extend the application
of Wielgos, because the omitted information in those cases did not
pertain to projections. Rather, it pertained to developments affecting
the respective issuer's market as a whole prior to the time the
prospectus was issued. The holding ofRACMortgageInvestment also
required an extension of Wielgos, because the omitted information did
not pertain to a disclosed forward-looking statement.
Other cases, on a similar theory, have held as follows: (1) a firm
issuing interests in mutual funds owning government-guaranteed
securities need not disclose that comparable products created by
competitors had lower fees, 20 (2) an investment bank need not
disclose to a customer that the customer would be required to deliver
additional funds to the investment bank if securities purchased on
115. Id. at 372. This statement was made in a discussion of a claim under Rule lOb-5
and the requirements to plead fraud with particularity. See id. The case does not explicitly
state whether the same test would apply under section 11 of the 1933 Act.
116. 765 F. Supp. 860, 861-63 (D. Md. 1991). The court described "residuals" as
follows:
[The issuer] then issues collateralized mortgage obligations ("CMOs") which are,
in essence, several series of bonds. The interest rates on the CMOs are set at a
level where payments under them are less than what is anticipated to be the income
received from the pool of mortgages. The "residual" is the difference between
what is taken in and what is paid out.
Id. at 862.
117. See id.at 864.
118. See id. at 862. A decrease in long-term interest rates could increase refmancings,
thereby decreasing cash flow received from the mortgages, whereas some of the CMOs
which it issued, representing debt obligations of the issuer, floated at short-term rates. See id.
119. Seeid. at864.
120. See Castillo v. Dean Witter Discover & Co., No. 97 Civ. 1272, 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9489, at *7, *25 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 1998).
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margin decreased in value,' and (3) a brokerage firm need not
disclose to a customer that the brokerage firm would retain earnings on
collateral posted in respect of the customer's short sales.'22 In a fourth
case, a court indicated that it would not be actionable under Rule 1Ob5 for a reporting company to fail to disclose, in connection with an
announcement of quarterly results, information concerning a
regulatory action adverse to the company's industry, where the
plaintiffs alleged
the adverse regulatory action was widely anticipated
23
in the industry.1
For a variety of reasons, however, it is untenable to assert that
only firm-specific information can be material.124 That position
conflicts with (1) the nature of information expressly required by the
SEC to be disclosed, (2) information generally included in
prospectuses, (3) other lower court opinions that examine
misstatements or omissions concerning information that is publicly
known or not firm-specific, (4) administrative actions of the SEC
extending back over half a century, and (5) two United States Supreme
Court cases that implicitly contradict this aspect of Wielgos.
A wide range of information that is not, or need not be, issuerspecific is required to be disclosed in prospectuses for registered
offerings. Issuers are required to disclose "sources and availability of
raw materials"; 25 "[t]he extent to which the business ... is or may be
seasonal";' 26 "[c]ompetitive conditions in the business involved
including, where material, ... an estimate of the number of
competitors and the registrant's competitive position, if known or
reasonably available to the registrant";'27 material risks to the issuer
arising from the potential failure of third parties, for example,

121. See Zerman v. Ball, 735 F.2d 15,21 (2d Cir. 1984) (not citing Wielgos).
122. See Levitin v. PaineWebber, Inc., 159 F.3d 698, 702-04 (2d Cir. 1998) (not citing
Wlelgos), cert.denied, 119 S. Ct. 1039 (1999).
123. See In re Glenayre Techs., Inc. Sec. Litig., 982 R Supp. 294, 296-97 (S.D.N.Y
1997).
124. Cf Cunningham, supra note 102, at 1418 ("[Tjhe concept of 'firm-specific
information' has no meaning under the federal securities laws-indeed, except in Wielgos
and its progeny, the concept simply does not exist in federal securities law jurisprudence.").
125. 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(iii) (1999).
126. Id. § 229.101(c)(v).
127. Id. § 229.101(c)(x); see Division of Corporation Finance, SEC, Updated Staff
Legal Bulletin No. 7, available in 1999 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 554, at *14-'*15 (June 7, 1999)
[hereinafter Staff Legal Bulletin No. 7] (providing a sample disclosure of a risk factor
concerning competition that describes actions taken by a competitor when it recently
expanded); cf Securities Act Industry Guide 2, Disclosure of Oil and Gas Operations, 1 Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 3826, at item 8(C)(iv) (July 14, 1999) (requiring, in respect of oil and
gas operations, disclosure of "competition for the acquisition of reserves and supplies').
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customers and suppliers, to address "Y2K" issues; 128 and certain tax
consequences arising from the ownership of the securities being
offered.'29 The SEC may require that a prospectus define terms in
common use among investors of ordinary sophistication. 3° As part of
administrative review of registration statements, the SEC will require
that definitions accompany indispensable technical terms "understood
only by industry experts." 131 Additionally, the SEC requires that the
following legend (or a similar legend) appear on the cover of a
prospectus: "Neither the Securities and Exchange Commission nor
any state securities commission has approved or disapproved of these
securities or passed upon the adequacy or accuracy of this prospectus.
Any representation to the contrary is a criminal offense.', 32 That
legend merely restates applicable law; it adds no new information
about the issuer or any investment in its securities. These items are
merely illustrative; they do not represent an exhaustive catalog. That
the information to be disclosed is available elsewhere, even if
generally known to sophisticated persons, cannot eliminate an issuer's
obligation to disclose the information. Were that the case, SEC rules
would not require this level of disclosure.
Current practice in drafting prospectuses also entails inclusion of
information that is not firm-specific. For example, the recent prospectus
for the IPO of Conoco Inc. included disclosure of the following risk
factors, among others: (1) the volatility of the market price for natural
gas, crude oil, and refined products, including the impact of
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Counties; (2) risks associated
with operating in markets outside the United States; (3) uncertainties
128. See Statement of the Commission Regarding Disclosure of Year 2000 Issues and
Consequences by Public Companies, Investment Advisers, Investment Companies, and
Municipal Securities Issuers, Securities Act Release No. 7558, 63 Fed. Reg. 41,394, 41,399400 (Aug. 4, 1998).
129. See 17 C.FR. § 229.202(b)(9) (1999) (requiring disclosure of tax effects on
holders of bonds sold at original issue discount); id. § 229.202 instruction 2(B)-(D)
(requiring, in connection with offerings of foreign issuers, disclosure of legal limits on
distributions by the respective issuer to U.S. residents and tax consequences to U.S. residents
under foreign law and U.S. taxation treaties); see also Securities Act Industry Guide 5,
Preparation of Registration Statements Relating to Interests in Real Estate Limited
Partnerships, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 3829, at item 12(A) (July 14, 1999) (requiring
disclosure of "all material Federal income tax aspects of the offering" in documents
pertaining to real estate limited partnerships).
130. See Limited Partnership Reorganizations and Public Offerings of Limited
Partnership Interests, Securities Act Release No. 6900, 56 Fed. Reg. 28,979, 28,980 (June 25,
1991) ("Registrants should not presume that the investor understands the import of terms
such as 'best-efforts,' 'minimum-maximum offering,' 'dissenters' or appraisal rights.' These
terms, when used, should be clearly explaned.').
131. Staff Legal Bulletin No. 7, supranote 127, at *36.
132. 17 C.FR. § 229.501(b)(7) (1999).
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inherent in computing "proved" oil and gas reserves; (4)hazards of
operating in Conoco's lines of business; and (5)risks of Y2K
noncompliance, which included reference to potential risks arising
from noncompliance by third parties. 133 The process by which the SEC
makes comments on registration statements prior to their effectiveness
creates a high likelihood that some of the comments given by the SEC,
for inclusion in the prospectus, will not be firm-specific. Because the
SEC does not hold its own due diligence meetings with employees of
the issuer, the SEC is not in a position to raise issues for inclusion in
IPO prospectuses other than those raised by publicly available
information or the disclosure itself.
A number of lower court cases are consistent with the position
that materiality is not limited to firm-specific information. The
Wielgos court justified the conclusion that disclosure obligations are
limited to firm-specific information on the basis that publicly available
information is incorporated into securities prices independent of the
disclosure of the information by the issuer.134 If misstatements or
omissions concerning publicly available information can be material,
the premise underlying this aspect of Wielgos is flawed. Yet the
language of a number of other lower court opinions contradicts this
premise, stating that the mere fact that information is publicly
available does not necessarily mean that an omission of the
information from a disclosure document is immaterial. 135
133. See CONOCO INC., PROSPECTUS 16-20 (Oct. 21, 1998), available in LEXIS,
Fedsec Library, Prosp File.
134. See supra notes 100-101 and accompanying text.
135. See, e.g., United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. International Paper Co., 985 F.2d
1190, 1199-1200 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that disclosure in a firm's 10-K did not cure
incomplete disclosure in a proxy statement, concluding, "The district court correctly ruled
that... the Company's 10-K Report to the SEC [was] not part of the total mix of information
reasonably available to shareholders," but stating, "The 'total mix' of information may also
include 'information already in the public domain and facts known or reasonably available to
the shareholders."' (quoting Rodman v. Grant Found., 608 F.2d 64, 70 (2d Cir. 1979)));
Schneider v. Vennard (Inre Apple Computer Sec. Litig.), 886 F.2d 1109, 1114 (9th Cir. 1989)
("Ordinarily, omissions by corporate insiders are not rendered immaterial by the fact that the
omitted facts are otherwise available to the public."); Kronfeld v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
832 F.2d 726, 736 (2d Cir. 1987) ("There are serious limitations on a corporation's ability to
charge its stockholders with knowledge of information omitted from a document such as a
proxy statement or prospectus on the basis that the information is public knowledge and
otherwise available to them."); Picard Chem. Inc. Profit Sharing Plan v. Perrigo Co., 940 F.
Supp. 1101, 1123 (W.D. Mich. 1996) ("In a case where plaintiffs allege fraud on the market,
'the defendant's failure to disclose material information may be excused where the
information has been made credibly available to the market by other sources.' While it
normally does not matter ifthe market is aware of certainfacts ifthe plaintiff remains

unaware,where a plaintiff alleges fraud on the market he is implicitly asserting reliance on
the integrity of the market." (citation omitted) (emphasis added) (quoting Schneider, 886 F.2d
at 1115)); Endo v. Albertine, 863 F. Supp. 708, 720 (N.D..Ill. 1994) (quoting Schneider, 886
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Other cases are inconsistent with this aspect of Wielgos in
holding that material information may encompass information that is
publicly available or not firm-specific. For example, failure to
disclose legal rights relevant to the audience to which a disclosure
document is directed can be material. One case held that the omission
from tender offer documents of disclosure concerning appraisal rights
available to dissenting shareholders was material as a matter of law.'36
This omission is akin to imposing liability on a firm for failing to act
as legal counsel to the recipients of the disclosure. Nevertheless, the
omission was actionable.
Numerous district court cases provide authority for the
proposition that information is not rendered immaterial by virtue of
public knowledge of the relevant information. For example, in
Monetary Management Group of St. Louis, Inc. v. Kidder,Peabody &
Co., the court considered an investment bank's misrepresentation that
bonds it was selling were marginable' 37 Although federal law
required that for the bonds to be marginable there needed to be at least
$25 million in principal amount of the bonds outstanding, only $15
million in principal amount of the bonds were outstanding. 3 ' Other
investment banks knew that the bonds were not marginable; when the
purchaser transferred the bonds to another investment bank, that
investment bank refused to margin the bonds.'39 Nevertheless, the
court held the misrepresentation to be material. 140 Another case
supporting this view is Dimelingv. Tucker Anthony andR.L. Day, Inc.,
in which the court held that misstatements concerning the taxability of
interest on a series of municipal bonds were material, notwithstanding

F.2d at 1114); Fisher v. Plessey Co., 559 F. Supp. 442, 446 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) ("[here may
well be instances in which the offeror's duty to disclose information in the offering materials
is not relieved by the public availability of the same information.').
That some of these cases involve proxy statements does not provide a basis for
distinguishing the cases. One could argue that there should be a different test of materiality
in the context of proxy rules, relative to trading in securities. There may be an efficient
market in the prices of securities without an efficient market in the exercise of voting rights

of securities. The United States Supreme Court, however, has held the test of materiality is
the same in actions under the proxy rules and under Rule lOb-5 (as applied to sales of
securities). See supranotes 91-92 and accompanying text.
136. See Valente v. PepsiCo, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 1228, 1239 (D. Del. 1978).
137. 615 F. Supp. 1217, 1220 (E.D. Mo. 1985). Marginal bonds are bonds that can be
purchased in part on credit provided by the investment bank. See PEssIN & Ross, supranote
7, at 410 (defiming "margin security").
138. Se MonetaryManagement Group, 615 F. Supp. at 1219-20.

139. See id. at 1220.
140. See id. at 1222-23.
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that a Moody's manual, a reference commonly
used by investment
41
banks, disclosed the correct information.'
Similarly, the court in PicardChemical Inc. Profit SharingPlan
v. Perrigo Co., in an opinion that referenced Wielgos, held to be
potentially material a failure by the issuer, a manufacturer of
pharmaceutical and personal care products, to disclose that Wal-Mart,
a customer or potential customer, preferred regional suppliers. 42
Schamber v. Aaberg is a comparable case addressing the materiality of
misstatements concerning customers of the issuer.143 In that case, the
court, in a bench trial, held to be materially misleading a false
statement that there was an established market for the issuer's
principal product, where in fact there was no current market "of any
consequence" for the product."4
Dickey v. Carter is yet another pertinent case. 4 5 The dispute
46
arose from the sale of stock of a newly formed insurance company.
The purchaser was advised that the insurance company would use a
"heretofore unused technique for mass marketing fire and automobile
insurance.' ' 147 The court, in a bench trial, found to be material the
seller's failure to disclose that a large underwriter of automobile
insurance "had
already announced its intention to mass market
148
insurance."'
A common fact pattern giving rise to liability involves brokers
who solicit purchases of types of securities more risky than their
customers' disclosed investment goals. Brokers exercising discretionary authority are subject to agency duties not generally relevant to
assessing materiality of misstatements or omissions. However,
omissions or misstatements concerning terms of securities, or
industries, being recommended have been held to be actionable even
where the customer ultimately determined to make the investment, that
is, trading not in a discretionary account."
Some of the above cases involve circumstances in which the
misstatement or omission was made in face-to-face communications,
141. No. 80-909, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13259, at *10, *27 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 8, 1982).
142. 940 F. Supp. 1101, 1112,1123-25 (W.D. Mich. 1996).
143. 186 F Supp. 52, 56 (D. Colo. 1960).
144. See id.
145. 392 F Supp. 1055 (D. Mass. 1975).
146. See id. at 1056-57.
147. Id. at 1056.
148. Id. at 1057.
149. See, e.g., Lukovich v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Civ. No. 85-1651-FR, 1986 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 26496, at *9 (D. Or. Apr. 21, 1986) (holding material, inter alia, a failure to disclose
"the risk connected with convertible preferred stock and also with purchasing oil and gas
stocks which could decline in value suddenly due to unstable oil and gas prices").
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or other communications outside a prospectus forming part of a
registration statement. That fact does not affect the relevance of those
cases to assessing the materiality of misstatements in, or omissions
from, prospectuses included in registration statements. Just as the test
of materiality does not vary depending on whether insiders were
trading,150 a statement that would be materially misleading when made
orally in one-on-one communication cannot lose its materiality by
being placed in a prospectus.
Each of the preceding cases is inconsistent with treating as
immaterial as a matter of law information that is not issuer-specific.
Some directly contradict that principle. Others contradict the premise
underlying that principle. Additional support is provided by the
substantial authority indicating that a disclosure document can be
actionable, even if it discloses all relevant information, where the mere
placement of the unfavorable information within the disclosure
document obscures its impact, commonly referenced as "buried
disclosure. ' 151 A representative case is Kennedy v. Tallant, which
involved an appeal from a judgment finding that disclosure made in
connection with sales of stock violated Rule lOb-5 52 The shares sold
to the public were class A shares entitled to elect a minority of the
issuer's board, whereas the officers and directors retained ninety
percent of the class B shares, which, as a class, were entitled to elect a
majority of the board.'53
One of the omissions found to be material by the district court
was that the promoters had "gained control of [the issuer] by the
purchase of class B common stock, thereby enabling them to
perpetuate themselves in office and control as long as they desired."' 54
The appellate court described the relevant prospectus disclosure as
follows:
The following pieces of information were included in each prospectus:
class B stockholders controlled a majority of the board of directors; the
officers and directors owned ninety percent of the outstanding class B
150. See infra notes 213-214 and accompanying text.
151. See, e.g., Kas v. Financial Gen. Bankshares, Inc., 796 F.2d 508, 516 (D.C. Cir.
1986); Gillette Co. v. RB Partners, 693 F. Supp. 1266, 1286-87 (D. Mass. 1988); Fradkin v.
Ernst, 571 R Supp. 829, 849 n.30 (N.D. Ohio 1983); Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc.,
322 F. Supp. 1331, 1362-63 (E.D. Pa. 1970), modified, 458 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1972); 1 Loss
& SELIGMAN, supranote 63, at 582-83 (3d ed. 1998); cf. 17 C.F.R. § 230.421(a) (1999) ("The
information required in a prospectus ... shall not ... be set forth in such fashion as to
obscure any of the required information or any information necessary to keep the required
information from being incomplete or misleading.").
152. 710F.2d711,714-15(llthCir. 1983).
153. Seeid.at714,720.
154. Id. at719.
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stock for which they paid forty-five hundred dollars, but owned only
2.75 percent of the outstanding class A and class B stock combined; the
charter and bylaws of [the issuer] could be amended only upon the
consent of a majority of class A stockholders and the consent of a
majority of class B stockholders. These statements were separated by
several pages in each prospectus. The ultimate conclusion, i.e., that
appellants would always control [the issuer], was never disclosed even
though this was precisely appellants' intent in organizing [the issuer]. 55

The court of appeals affirmed the judgment as to this omission." 6 The
court of appeals stated: "Full and fair disclosure cannot be achieved

through piecemeal release of subsidiary facts which if stated
together
15 7
might provide a sufficient statement of the ultimate fact."
It is difficult to discuss carefully the sufficiency of disclosure
based solely on a description of the disclosure.

Nevertheless, it

appears that Kennedy holds actionable the failure to summarize
information, or provide a conclusion that appears self-evident, based
on the fact that the information in question was spread out over a few
pages. If the knowledge and effort required to assimilate that
information is sufficiently substantial to make disclosure misleading, it
follows a fotiori that the general availability of information in the
market does not necessarily eliminate the materiality of its omission.
The SEC's recent requirement that prospectuses be drafted in "plain

English" similarly indicates the importance of the manner in which
disclosure is made. 58
155. Id. at 720 (emphasis added).
156. Seeid.

157. Id.
158. See Plain English Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 7497, 63 Fed. Reg.
6370 passim (Feb. 6, 1998) (requiring "plain English" in various portions of prospectuses).
The importance placed on this matter is illustrated by the fact that a substantial portion-in
some cases, over half-of the SEC comments on recent IPO prospectuses have concerned
stylistic matters. See Bridget O'Brian, PaperChase: SEC Is Tough Grader, WALL ST. J.,
July 6, 1999, at Cl.
One might argue, however, that the SEC's vigor in this effort is excessive. Recent SEC
comments on prospectuses have included the following: (1) the required substitution of
personal pronouns for "Company," see id.; (2) "'[t]he use of small Roman numerals in
parentheses is legalistic and should be avoided throughout your document,"' id.; (3) that
"such" not be used as a synonym for "this," "these" or "the," see Staff Legal Bulletin No. 7,
supra note 127, at *20; (4) that "defeased" not be used, see id. at *24; and (5) that the cover
page not use cascading margins, see id. at *26, a stylistic touch that market professionals
identify with particular investment banks, see O'Brian, supra (quoting a description of one
prohibited layout as being "as distinctive 'as Tide coming in an orange plastic container'
(quoting William Wright, Managing Director of Client Services, Morgan Stanley Dean

Witter & Co.)).
In implementing its views on drafing, however, the SEC seems to be a machine that
"'go[es] of itself."' See Donald P. Board, Retooling "ABankruptcy Machine That Would Go
ofltself, 72 B.U. L. REv. 243, 243 n.* (1992) (applying the phrase, which he attributes to
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The United States Supreme Court has stated that disclosure that
would mislead a reasonable person remains misleading even if it
would not be misleading to a sophisticated securities analyst:
But not every mixture with the true will neutralize the deceptive. If
it would take a financial analyst to spot the tension between the one and
the other, whatever is misleading will remain materially so, and liability
should follow. The point of a proxy statement, after all, should be to
inform, not to challenge the reader's critical wits. Only when the
inconsistency would exhaust the misleading conclusion's capacity to
influence the reasonable
159 shareholder would a § 14(a) action fail on the
element ofmateriality.
In the context of the effect of disclosure on the market price of a
security, the principles expressed in Wielgos would indicate that
disclosure sufficient to inform market professionals should suffice.160
Nevertheless, the Court indicated disclosure that is misleading to a
reasonable person is actionable, even if it would not be misleading to a
sophisticated person."'
James Russell Lowell, in the context of bankruptcy law) (book review). Other SEC
disclosure comments or requirements have included:
(1) that references to "certain circumstances" or "certain extraordinary matters,"
which are terms frequently used to identify exceptions described elsewhere (either within the
particular filing or in filed exhibits), be replaced with brief descriptions of the qualifications,
see Staff Legal Bulletin No. 7, supra note 127, at *23;
(2)
that the phrase 'Joint book-running manager" be removed from a prospectus,
notwithstanding that the phrase has meaning, the underwriters argued, to institutional
investors, see O'Brian, supra; and
(3)
that the cover page not include text written in all capital letters, allegedly because
that typography impedes legibility, see Staff Legal Bulletin No. 7, supra note 127, at *26,
even though until 1998, SEC rules expressly required the use of precisely this type of legend,
see Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, Securities Act Release No. 6383,47 Fed. Reg.
11,380, 11,421 (Mar. 16, 1982) (adding 17 C.F.R. § 229.501(c)(5)), amended by Plain
English Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 7497, 63 Fed. Reg. 6370, 6383 (Feb. 6,
1998).
A fourth example involved draft disclosure that used the term "e-commerce," which the
SEC required to be clarified. See O'Brian, supra. In the original filing, the term "ecommerce" was used throughout the prospectus. See VEm'rcANEr INC., RwISRATION
STATEMENT, passim (Nov. 27, 1998), available in LEXIS, Fedsec Library, Filing File. A
definition of "e-commerce" was provided. See id. at 3. Nevertheless, it would appear that
SEC comments caused the phrase to be ultimately removed in its entirety from the prospectus
and replaced with the phrase "electronic commerce," conveniently defined as "the buying
and selling of goods and services over the Intemet." VERrCALNET INc., PRosPEcTus 1 (Feb.
10, 1999), available in LEXIS, Fedsec Library, Prosp File.
159. Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1097-98 (1991) (citations

omitted).
160. See supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
161. See VirginiaBankshares,501 U.S. at 1097-98. The fact that Virginia Bankshares
involved a proxy statement, as opposed to disclosure in a prospectus, should not affect the
conclusion. See supra note 135.
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Administrative actions also are consistent with the notion that
publicly available information, or information that is not issuerspecific, is not per se immaterial.162 In issuing a "stop order"
suspending the effectiveness of a registration statement, the SEC relied
in part on the registration statement's failure to disclose that shares
being offered at one dollar per share under the registration statement
were actively trading over-the-counter at a substantial discount to that
price. 63 The SEC has also ruled that the registration statement for an
issuer in the oil and gas business was materially misleading in failing
to disclosehat "drilling rules," which appear to have been similar to
zoning ordinances, limited the issuer to drilling only one well per forty
acres.'"
In another administrative action, the SEC found that a
registration statement for a newly organized corporation formed to
invest in insurance companies was materially misleading in its failure
to disclose "the extent to which the insurance business [was] highly
competitive in the area [it] intend[ed] to operate" and that "many
recently organized insurance companies [were] operating at a loss. ' ' 6'
When issuing a stop order suspending the effectiveness of a
registration statement filed by American Finance Company, the SEC
stated that the registration statement for a firm that financed the sales
of automobiles purchased primarily by U.S. government employees
located overseas should disclose "the risks inherent in a finance
business and the effect thereon of [the] registrant's practice of making
loans primarily to enlisted military personnel outside the United
a The SEC further stated:
States. 166
Moreover, in view of the fact that over 95% of [the] registrant's
business originates overseas, the summary statement should call
attention to and explain the extent to which [the] registrant's business is
subject to the restrictions and laws of the governments of the United
States and of foreign nations and to changes in them, as for example,
162. Cf Denial of Petition for Rulemaking Concerning the Need for Consistent
Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 17,390, 21 SEC Docket 1117, 1117-18 (Dec. 18,
1980) (indicating that information concerning estimates by reporting companies of expenses
to comply with proposed regulations, prepared for presentation to other regulatory
authorities, may be required to be disclosed).
163. See Cristina Copper Mines, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 3439, available in
1952 SEC LEXIS 7, at *9-*10 (May 1, 1952).
164. See Shawnee Chiles Syndicate, Securities Act Release No. 2665, available in
1941 SEC LEXIS 227, at *6 (Sept. 19, 1941).
165. American Investors Corp., Securities Act Release No. 3771, available in 1957
SEC LEXIS 664, at *8 (Apr. 5, 1957), stop order lifted, Securities Act Release No. 3810,
available in 1957 SEC LEXIS 302 (July 9, 1957).
166. American Finance Co., Securities Act Release No. 4465, available in 1962 SEC
LEXIS 632, at *10-*11 (Mar. 19, 1962), stop orderlifted, Securities Act Release No. 4538,
availablein 1962 SEC LEXIS 153 (Oct. 2, 1962).
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the recent adoption of governmental regulations discontinuing the
privilege of free transportation to this country. of foreign-made
automobiles acquired by military personnel.167

This information is not issuer-specific. Nevertheless, the SEC
indicated that its inclusion was required.
In suspending the effectiveness of a registration statement filed
by Republic Cement Corporation, a newly formed issuer that proposed
to engage in cement manufacturing, the SEC stated the registration
statement was deficient in failing to disclose differences in use and
cost to manufacture between types of cement the issuer was intending
to produce. 68 Disclosure unlikely to mislead any but the most
unsophisticated investor also has been found to be materially
misleading.'6 9 These illustrative administrative actions identify the
167. Id. at *11. This concern with disclosure of legal matters is not unique. See, e.g.,
Securities Act Industry Guide 2, Disclosure of Oil and Gas Operations, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 3826, at item 8(C)(iii) (July 14, 1999) (requiring brief disclosure of relevant federal
and state price regulation by firms in the oil and gas industry); Securities Act Industry Guide
5, Preparation of Registration Statements Relating to Interests in Real Estate Limited
Partnerships, I Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 3829, at item 7(C)(v) (July 14, 1999) (requiring
disclosure of risks associated with rent stabilization programs).
168. See Republic Cement Corp., Securities Act Release No. 3816, available in 1957
SEC LEXIS 672, at *8(July 26, 1957).
169. The SEC made the following observations concerning an advertisement issued by
an investment adviser, in examining whether the advertisement complied with Rule 206(4)-1,
17 C.FR. § 275.206(4)-1(a)(5) (1999), which renders unlawful the use by an investment
adviser of an advertisement "[w]hich contains any untrue statement of a material fact, or
which is otherwise false or misleading":
Another advertisement, after describing the outstanding increase in the price
of Zenith Radio Corporation stock made the following ostensibly sobering
qualification[] "But by and large, experiencehas taught us that it is more prudent
to set modest goalsfor special situations... perhapsa 100% profit in 18 months.
Then, if developments turn out morefavorably than we conservatively anticipated,
and ifa stock turned out to be a long-termfortune-builder(ofthe nature ofZenith),
then your surprisewould be a pleasantone. Far better, we believe, to try and set

modest goals and exceed them occasionally, than to set unrealistic goals and fall
short of them continuously." This language, rather than modifying [the]
registrant's optimism, suggested to the reader that the "modest" and "conservative"
goal of a 100% profit in 18 months was surely attainable under [the] registrant's
'prudent" securities selections. In our view [the] registrant's optimism was so
extravagant that even an explicit caveat could not have brought this advertisement
up to the statutory standard.
Spear & Staff, Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 188, [1964-1965 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 77,216, at 82,305 (Mar. 25, 1965) (footnote omitted) (omission in
original).
Similarly, although the fraudulent elements of a pyramid scheme are apparent to a
moderately sophisticated person once the terms of the arrangement are disclosed, it is no
defense to a fraud action against promoters of pyramid schemes that the essential elements of
the scheme are made known to the victims. See Multi-Level Distributorships and Pyramid
Sales Plans, Securities Act Release No. 5211, 36 Fed. Reg. 23,289, 23,291 (Dec. 8, 1971) ("It
further appears to the Commission that the pyramid sales promotions that are often employed
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long history of requiring disclosure of information that is not firmspecific. As an administrative agency charged with enforcing a
specialized1 70field, the SEC's views on materiality are entitled to
deference.
Moreover, two additional United States Supreme Court decisions
concerning materiality under the federal securities laws also indirectly
contradict the view that material information is limited to information
that is firm-specific.' 7' Those cases imply that omissions of
information that is publicly available can be material, which is
inconsistent with rationale articulated in Wielgos for limiting
materiality to firm-specific information.
The case in which the Supreme Court formulated the test for
materiality, TSC Industries,Inc. v. Northway, Inc., involved allegedly
misleading disclosure addressing two matters: (1) the extent of an
acquiring firm's control over a target corporation at the time proxies
were solicited and (2) the favorableness of the terms of the acquisition
to shareholders of the target. 172 As to the first matter, the court of
appeals held that three omissions from the proxy statement were
material as a matter of law: (1) that the chairman of the board of the
target was the president and CEO of the bidding firm, (2) that the
chairman of the target's executive committee was an officer of the
bidder, and (3) that "in filing reports required by the SEC, both [the
target] and [the bidder] had indicated that [the bidder] 'may be deemed
to be a "parent" of [the target] as that term is defined in the Rules and
in connection with the sale of securities of the types described above may be inherently
fraudulent."); see also Davis v. AVCO Fin. Sen's., Inc., 739 F.2d 1057, 1062, 1068 (6th Cir.
1984) (affirming in part liability under the predecessor to section 12(a)(2) in connection with
a pyramid scheme where a review of the terms promptly disclosed "the inherent fallacy of the
...scheme[,] indicat[ing] that its defects were obvious"); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters.,
Inc., 348 F. Supp. 766, 771 (D. Or. 1972) (noting that pyramid schemes are "inherently
unstable" and analogizing them to "chain letters" that are actionable under 18 U.S.C. § 1341),
aff'd, 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973).
170. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239 n.16 (1988) ("The SEC's insights
are helpful, and we accord them due deference.'); see also TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway,
Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 n.10 (1976) ("in defining materiality under Rule 14a-9, we are, of
course, giving content to a rule promulgated by the SEC pursuant to broad statutory authority
to promote 'the public interest' and 'the protection of investors.' Under these circumstances,
the SEC's view of the proper balance between the need to insure adequate disclosure and the
need to avoid the adverse consequences of setting too low a threshold for civil liability is
entitled to consideration." (citations omitted)); cf Ralph C. Ferrara et al., Disclosure of
InformationBearing on Management Integrityand Competency, 76 Nw. U. L. REv.555, 611

(1981) ("[C]ourts often defer to the Commission's expertise by requiring disclosure of
qualitatively material information specifically called for by Commission rules.").
171. See TSCIndus., 426 U.S. at 450-51; Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406
U.S. 128 (1972).
172. 426 U.S. at450-51.
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Regulations under the Securities Act of 1933."" 73 The Supreme Court
reversed the holding that these omissions were material as a matter of
law, and remanded the case for trial. 74
This omitted information concerning the relationship between the
bidder and the target would appear to have been public. One of the
allegedly improper omissions was, it appears, the failure to repeat in
the proxy statement information included in other documents filed
with the SEC. It is difficult to construe that information as nonpublic.
The other information pertained to the other affiliations of two officers
of the target, a public company, with the bidder created nine months
before the date of the proxy statement, in connection with the purchase
by the bidder of thirty-four percent of the target's voting securities. 75
It is difficult to imagine that this information was not generally known
to market professionals who followed the target's stock. Were this
public information immaterial as a matter of law, the Court could have
so stated. That the case was remanded, without an indication that
these statements were immaterial as a matter of law, indicates that this
type of information can be material.
One might object to this characterization of TSC Industries as
reflecting too fine a parsing of its language. Yet, subsequent
discussion of the case by the Supreme Court in Virginia Bankshares,
Inc. v. Sandbergseems to confirm that reading. 76 VirginiaBankshares
involved a proxy statement for a freeze-out merger.177 The Virginia
Bankshares Court examined the potential actionability of the following
language in a proxy statement: "The Plan of Merger has been
approved by the Board of Directors because it provides an opportunity
for the [target's] public shareholders to achieve a high value for their
shares."' 78 The proxy statement at issue described the acquisition price
as exceeding both book value and market value, although the plaintiffs
presented evidence indicating a per share going-concern value of the
target substantially higher than the price contemplated in the merger.'79
In holding that "a specific statement of reason knowingly false or
misleadingly incomplete" may be actionable, the Court, stated:
This analysis comports with the holding that marked our nearest
prior approach to the issue faced here, in TSC Industries. There, to be
173. Id. at451.

174. Seeid.at463-64.
175. See id. at440-41.
176. 501 U.S. 1083, 1095 (1991).
177. See id. at 1087-88.

178. Id. at 1090 (internal quotations omitted).
179. See id. at 1094.
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sure, we reversed summary judgment for a ...plaintiff who had sued
on a description of proposed compensation for minority shareholders as
offering a "substantial premium over current market values." But we

held only that on the case's undisputed facts the conclusory adjective

"substantial" was not materially misleading as a necessary matter of

law, and our remandfor trialassumed that such a description could be
both materially misleading within the meaning of Rule 14a-9 and
actionableunder § 14(a)."

This language indicates the remand in TSC Industries reflected a
judgment that the allegedly misleading statements at issue in TSC
Industriescould be found by a jury to be materially misleading."8 '
One of the omissions considered actionable in a second Supreme
Court case, Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, was even more
strikingly "public."'8 The claims in that case included, inter alia, that
persons making a market in an unusual security violated Rule lOb-5 in
connection with purchases made by, or facilitated by, them at prices
materially below the prevailing market prices.' The Court stated,
"'lie sellers had the right to know ...that their shares were selling for
a higher price in that market."" 4
A review of relevant precedent thus discloses a series of cases
and administrative decisions extending back half a century
inconsistent with the notion that materiality is limited to firm-specific
180. Id. at 1095 (citation omitted) (emphasis added) (Souter, J.).
181. The use of the word "assumed," in lieu of "implied," is unfortunate. It could
mean "assumed, without deciding," but that reading would divest the paragraph of meaning.
As noted above, see supra text accompanying note 172, there were two types of
statements that the plaintiffs in TSC Industries alleged to be actionable: (1) omissions
concerning the relationship between the bidder and the target and (2) an inaccurate
characterization of the favorableness of the terms of the transaction. Although the Vrginia
Bankshares Court indicated the remand in YNC Industries implied a jury could find the
second type of misstatement materially misleading, it did not make a similar statement about
the other information at issue in TSC Industries-therelationship between the bidder and the
target. See Virginia Bankshares, 501 U.S. at 1087. That fact does not undermine the
conclusion that TSC Industries means publicly available information can be material. The
terms of the remand in TSC Industries do not indicate that only one of these two types of
information can be actionable. The analysis applies equally to both types of information at
issue in TSC Industries.
182. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
183. Seeid. at 144-45, 153.
184. Id. at 153; cf SEC v. United Fin. Group, Inc., 474 F.2d 354, 358 n.9 (9th Cir.
1973) (holding that the SEC made a prima facie case of fraud and citing, inter alia, offering
materials for a mutual fund that "failed to disclose to prospective investors that the market
price for its shares was nonexistent and that the price was arbitrarily fixed"). Although the
holding in Affiliated Ute Citizens is consistent with the shingle theory, under which brokers
can be held liable to customers for charging unreasonable prices, see 8 Loss & SEUGMAN,
supranote 63, at 3777, 3779 (3d ed. 1991), the Court noted that its decision was not based on
a theory that the defendants were broker-dealers. See Affiliated Ute Citizens, 406 U.S. at 154
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information. Reference in Wzelgos to the "truth-on-the-market"
defense, as a basis for asserting that issuers need only disclose firmspecific information, 8 ' is inapposite. The truth-on-the-market defense
represents a basis on which firms may avoid liability under Rule 1Ob-5
for misstatements.'86 That defense is relevant to proof of reliance, a
required element of a cause of action under Rule 1Ob-5. 8 7 The fraudon-the-market theory allows investors to create a presumption of
reliance, thereby avoiding the need to prove actual reliance, where
there is an active market in the securities in question."' The
underlying principle is that an efficient market promptly reflects all
available information. Thus, if one purchases securities in a fully
developed market, expecting that the stock price reflects all available
information, where allegedly misleading favorable information is
available to the market, one purchasing at the market price would be
purchasing at an excessive price, ceteris paribus. The truth-on-themarket defense represents one manner in which defendants can negate
the presumption of reliance-in that case, by proving information
indicating that the market price was not affected by the misstatement
in question.' 9
However, a plaintiff need not prove reliance in order to prevail
under section 11 or section 12(a)(2) of the 1933 Act.'
Issuer
defendants can limit their liability under those sections by proving all
or a portion of the loss was not caused by the defendants'
misstatements or omissions.'' But that the efficient capital markets
hypothesis yields a presumption of reliance in a Rule 1Ob-5 action
does not fairly imply that public dissemination of otherwise material
information omitted from a prospectus proves a defense of loss
causation as a matter of law.'92 And the availability of these defenses
185. See supratext accompanying note 144.
186. See 2 HAZEN, supranote 6, § 13.5B, at 538 (practitioner's ed. 3d ed. 1995).
187. See 2 id.
§ 13.2.1, at466.
188. See2id.§ 13.5B, at534-37.
189. See2id. § 13.5B, at538.
190. See, e.g., Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 382 (1983) ("If a
plaintiff purchased a security issued pursuant to a registration statement, he need only show a

material misstatement or omission to establish his prima facie case [under section 11].
Liability against the issuer of a security is virtually absolute, even for innocent
misstatements." (footnote omitted)); 9 Loss & SEGIGMAN, supra note 63, at 4202
(§ 12(a)(2)), 4249-50 (§ 11) (3d ed. 1992). A minor caveat is that under section 11 a plaintiff
must prove reliance where the purchase is made after the issuance of "an earning statement
covering a period of at least twelve months beginning after the effective date of the
registration statement." 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1994).
191. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e); id.
§ 771(b) (Supp. 1111997).
192. Cf Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224,249 n.29 (1988) ("We note there may be
a certain incongruity between the assumption that Basic shares are traded on a wellHeinOnline -- 74 Tul. L. Rev. 917 1999-2000
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does not directly bear on the materiality of the omitted statement. 193
Rather, these defenses provide that even where material information is
omitted, there may be no remedy to a private plaintiff where the
misstatement caused no damage. Wielgos confuses materiality for
causation or reliance.
The history of section 12 of the 1933 Act confirms that
conclusion. Prior to 1995, there was no loss causation defense to an
action under section 12 alleging the sale of a security by means of a
false or misleading prospectus.' 94 The issuer could only defend on the
basis that (1) it did not know, and with reasonable diligence could not
have known, of the misstatement or omission, or (2) the victim was
aware of the untruth or omission. 5 This language in section 12(a)(2),
which renders actionable sales by means of an "untrue statement of a
material fact," '96 and the correlative terms concerning omissions, were
not changed by that 1995 amendment. 197 The remedy formerly
provided was recission; no decrease in the remedy was available as a
consequence of other factors having adversely affected the market
price. 9 That investors other than the plaintiff were not misled was
not relevant!" If "truth-on-the-market" did not negate materiality
prior to that amendment, it cannot negate materiality subsequent to
that amendment, as that amendment by its terms does not purport to
modify the definition of materiality.2° Moreover, that a private
plaintiff cannot prove damages does not render the activity lawful-

developed, efficient, and information-hungry market, and the allegation that such a market
could remain misinformed, and its valuation of Basic shares depressed, for 14 months, on the
basis of the three public statements. Proof of that sort is a matter for trial .... Thus, we see
no need to engage in the kind of factual analysis the dissent suggests that manifests the
'oddities' of applying a rebuttable presumption of reliance in this case." (citations omitted)).
193. Cf 2 HAZEN, supra note 6, § 13.5B, at 536 (practitioner's ed., 3d ed. 1995)
(stating that materiality does not trigger the presumption of reliance absent evidence that "the
market reacted to the misstatements"). But see Picard Chem. Inc. Profit Sharing Plan v.
Perrigo Co., 940 F. Supp 1101, 1124 n.15 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (disagreeing with Hazen and
stating that the existence of truthful information bears on materiality by affecting the "total
mix" of available information).
194. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 105,
109 Stat. 737,757 (1995) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 771 (Supp. III 1997)).
195. See 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1994).
196. Id.
197. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act § 105, 109 Stat. at 757.
198. See 15 U.S.C. § 771 (Supp. 1111997).
199. See id.
200. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act § 105, 109 Stat. at 757.
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enforcement proceedings, in which courts have held the SEC need not
prove reliance, would still be available.2"'

The preceding discussion indicates the principle that only firmspecific information is material, on the basis that other publicly
available information is necessarily incorporated into the price at
which securities trade, is not well founded. SEC rules expressly
require disclosure of some such information.2 2 Numerous cases and
administrative decisions have reached holdings inconsistent with that
principle.2 3 The view that only firm-specific information is material
would appear, then, to represent merely another fallacious doctrinal

development arising from a single-minded pursuit by a portion of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit of personal
notions of efficiency, based on entirely speculative assessments of
costs and benefits, in cavalier disregard of precedent. 4 Nevertheless,
even if one were persuaded by the general principle that a failure to

disclose information that is not firm-specific cannot be a material
omission, for the reasons set forth below, the rationale for that
principle is inapplicable in the context of IPOs and the principle,
therefore, cannot rationally be applied to disclosure in the context of

anlIPO.
In general, there is, by definition, not a "well-developed" market
in a security immediately before it is first sold to the public in an
IPO-there is no public market at all.20" The price at which the stock
is initially sold is not the product of a process that can be considered
efficient-the price need not "represent" all publicly available
information.206 That this market is not efficient means disclosure to
201. See SECv. Rana Research, Inc., 8F3d 1358, 1359, 1363-64 (9th Cir. 1993); SEC
v. North Am. Research & Dev. Corp., 424 F.2d 63, 84 (2d Cir. 1970); 2 HAzEN, supra note 6,
§ 13.5B, at 109 (practitioner's ed., 3d ed. Supp. 1999).
202. See supra notes 125-129 and accompanying text.
203. See supranotes 136-184 and accompanying text
204. See generally Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 234, 235 & n.11 (1988)
(rejecting the rationale of Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169, 1177-78 (7th Cir. 1987), in
which the Seventh Circuit reasoned "backwards from a goal of economic efficiency" to
support the conclusion that disclosure of acquisition transactions need not be made prior to an
agreement on the terms of the transaction).
205. There is a narrow exception to this statement. A public trading market could
subsequently develop in the common stock of an issuer that undertook one or a series of
private placements of its stock. In such a case, the issuer would be required to file periodic
reports under the 1934 Act, if it had assets exceeding $10 million and at least 500
shareholders of record. See 15 U.S.C. § 781(gXl) (1994); 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-I (1999). For
ease of exposition, that unusual pattern is disregarded in this discussion.
206. See Robert A. Prentice & John H. Langmore, Beware of Vaporware: Product
Hype and the Securities FraudLiability of High-Tech Companies, 8 HARV. J.L. & TEcH. 1,
49 n.242 (1994); Shayne & Soderquist supranote 2, at 965. In recognition of this fact, some
lower courts have developed a related principle, applicable in the context of IPOs, sometimes
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the market as a whole cannot be relied upon to substitute for disclosure
that should be in a prospectus." 7
Moreover, the process of gathering and analyzing disparate
pieces of publicly available information, for purposes of valuing stock
to be sold in an IPO, is not costless. 08 As noted above, finance
theorists argue that stock sold in an IPO is intentionally priced below
the equilibrium price to induce prospective investors to reveal
information bearing on the value of the stock to be sold in an IPO. °9
The information being revealed is derived from non-firm-specific
sources--"factors outside the issuing firm" such as "information
21
about an issuing firm s competitors.""
This postulate directly
contradicts the application of Wielgos to IPOs. To the extent one
believes this finance theory, the substantial amount of money annually
represented by the short-term returns on IPOs-ten percent or fifteen
percent of $40 billion is a large number-necessarily implies that there
are material costs to orchestrating the use of publicly available
information, or information that otherwise is not firm-specific, to the
extent required to value securities to be sold in an IPO. Requiring
firms to facilitate this process by extending the disclosure obligations
in IPOs beyond firm-specific information can decrease costs because
(1) those firms might not be at a cost disadvantage to investors in
assembling this information and (2) imposing that obligation on a
referenced as the "fraud-created-the-market" theory. Under this theory, a plaintiff seeking to
meet the reliance element of a Rule lob-5 action can demonstrate that, absent fraud, the
securities in question would not have been marketed. See, e.g., Carlon v. Thaman (In re
NationsMart Corp. Sec. Litig.), 130 F.3d 309, 321 (8th Cir. 1997) ("Some courts recognize a
'fraud-created-the-market' theory, where reliance may be presumed if the defendants'
fraudulent activity is 'so pervasive that it goes to the very existence of the [securities] and the
validity of their presence on the market.' Not all courts have accepted the fraud-created-themarket theory." (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Ross v. Bank South, N.A.,
885 F.2d 723, 729 (11th Cir. 1989))).
207. Cf. Ballan v. Wilfred Am. Educ. Corp., 720 F. Supp. 241, 251 (E.D.N.Y 1989)
("A plaintiff must in the end choose between the fraud-on-the-market theory and a contention
that published information did not reach him because it was 'buried' or revealed only to the
SEC. The two are logically inconsistent.").
208. Cf. F.H. Buckley, When the Medium Is the Message: CorporateBuybacks as
Signals, 65 hon. L.J. 493, 528 (1990) ("[M]arkets cannot be perfect if information is costly.
This is not however, a fundamental criticism of market efficiency, because markets are
uninteresting unless information is costly. Without search costs, a knowledge of market price
would be valueless for uninformed free riders. What is important is not perfect efficiency
and costless information, but relative efficiency and costly information. In such markets,
search costs still represent a deadweight efficiency loss to the extent that they can be reduced
by signalling policies." (footnote omitted)); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel,
Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 685 (1984)
(stating, in the disclosure context "searching out ... information is costly").
209. See supra text accompanying notes 45-48.
210. Benveniste & Spindt, supranote 45, at 344 (emphasis added).
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single firm avoids duplicative costs.211 The heuristic argument in
Wielgos supporting the efficiency of nondisclosure is not applicable to
IPOs.
This is not to say that issuing firms should be required to disclose
all potentially relevant information-there needs to be some end to the
process by which an issuer educates its investors. All relevant
information would be essentially infinite. Rather, the more restrained
point is as follows: even if one believes the economic argument
against requiring the disclosure of information that is not firm-specific,
that argument has no application to IPOs because the premise-that
the relevant market is efficient-is confutableY
B.

Reasonsfor the Omission

Occasionally, some insight into the materiality of an omission can
be gained by examining the reasons for the omission. If the omission
arose from an expectation or concern that disclosure could affect the
purchase decision or the process by which the security would be
marketed, that fact would be consistent with the omission being
material. If the omission were inadvertent-and thus the fact in
question would have been disclosed absent an oversight-that pattern
is also consistent with materiality, although less strongly so. One may
intend generally to disclose information, even though it is immaterial,
solely because it is practice to do so or for other reasons independent
ofmateriality.
There is some authority bearing on the efficacy of this
perspective. The Supreme Court stated in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, '"We
recognize that trading (and profit making) by insiders can serve as an
indication of materiality." 3 One of the cases cited by the Court, in
discussing proxy rules, stated:
211. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 208, at 674-75 (noting that reliance on
investigation by investors produces duplicative expenditures).
212. See supranote 206 and accompanying text.
213. 485 U.S. 224, 240 n.18 (1988) (emphasis omitted); accord SEC v. Geon Indus.,
Inc., 531 F.2d 39, 48 (2d Cir. 1976) (stating insiders "demonstrated the importance they
attached to the information by purchasing shares"); SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301, 1307 (2d
Cir. 1974) ("But we need not merely speculate as to how a reasonable investor might have
received this information. The behavior of the appellant, his partner ...and others who
knew of the merger, all of whom were sophisticated investors, demonstrates empirically that
the information was material."); SEC v. Ingram, 694 F. Supp. 1437, 1441 (C.D. Cal. 1988)
("[Tihe fact that significant purchases were made after years of only marginal trading
indicates that the information was material.'); 4 Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note 63, at 2081
(3d ed. 1990) ("In insider trading cases, a purchase by a defendant of stock or options when
the defendant does not have a history of securities trading (or an increased level of trading
activity by one who does) often has been cited as useful circumstantial evidence.').
HeinOnline -- 74 Tul. L. Rev. 921 1999-2000

922

TULANE LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 74:883

A fact does not become more material to the shareholder's decision
because it is withheld by an insider, or because the insider might profit
by withholding it.
... [A]lthough § 14(a) requires any party soliciting proxies,
regardless of his status or interest in the transaction, to disclose all
material information, a self-dealing insider may have a "heavier burden
of disclosure" in the sense that he will find it more difficult
to convince
2 14
the court that he has met the requirements of § 14(a).
The reason why trading by insiders "can serve as an indication of
materiality" is that the actions of insiders, in this context, may manifest
insiders' assessments of undisclosed information. Insiders are in a
unique position to assess the relevance and importance of information
to their respective firms. They have distinctive access to other relevant
information. That they often have disproportionate investments tied to
the results of their firms makes clear their bias--an interest in assuring
positive stock performance.2" 5 Where a decision not to disclose
information is based on an anticipated negative impact of that
information on the market for the firm's securities, such a decision
similarly implies materiality.
It must be conceded that there may be factors not bearing on
materiality that cause firms not to disclose information. That fact does
not eliminate the value of examining motives for omissions in
assessing materiality. Rather, just as in the case of insider trading, this
possibility merely means that the results of this perspective are not
necessarily incontrovertible. For example, omission of information
that the seller reasonably expects to be already known by the purchaser
would be benign. That view would be less persuasive, however,
where disclosure is avoided because the information would be
unfavorable. As a consequence of the economic bias of insiders, it is
suspect for insiders to assert that negative information was not
disclosed because the information was already public. A second
rationale that does not imply materiality would be an omission of
details where complete disclosure would produce a document whose
length could obscure more important information.2 16
214. Pavlidis v. New Eng. Patriots Football Club, Inc., 737 F.2d 1227, 1231 (1st Cir.
1984).
215. Section 16(c) of the 1934 Act renders unlawful short sales by insiders. See 15

U.S.C. § 78p(c) (1994).

216. See White v. Melton, 757 F. Supp. 267,269-70,273 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (involving a
mutual fund prospectus which "incorporated by reference" information included in a publicly
available "Statement of Additional Information," where the SEC had previously expressed
concern that mutual fund prospectuses had become too lengthy, see Registration Form Used
by Open-End Management Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No. 6479, 48 Fed.
Reg. 37,928, 37,929 (Aug. 22, 1983)); Insurance Underwriters Clearing House, Inc. v.
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These circumstances can be contrasted with other fact patterns in
which this perspective-the reason for the omission-indicates that the
omission should be actionable. Paradigmatic Would be an omission
made because it was believed that a complete description would
adversely affect the marketing of the security. Yet even omissions
arising from inadvertence would be consistent with the materiality of
the omission. Consider, for example, McMahan & Co. v. Wherehouse
Entertainment,Inc., a case involving a "poison put" provision in a
series of bonds, which authorized the holder to put the bonds to the
issuer in the event of certain changes in control. 17 The terms of the
poison put required the issuer to offer to repurchase bonds upon the
taking of certain extraordinary corporate actions.21 As described in
the prospectus, the repurchase rights were not triggered, however,
when the "Independent Directors" approved the transaction. 9 'The
offering materials defined an 'Independent Director' as 'a director of
the Company' who was not a recent employee but who was a member
of the board of directors on the date of the offering or who was
subsequently elected to the board by the then-Independent
Directors." 220
One and one-half years after the bonds were issued, the issuer
sought to enter into a leveraged buyout.221 The Independent Directors
approved the transaction, thereby relieving the issuer from its
obligation to offer to repurchase the bonds.222 Bondholders alleged
that the prospectus was misleading, in violation of sections 11 and
12(a)(2) of the 1933 Act and Rule lOb-5 under the 1934 Act, on the
Natomas Co., 228 Cal. Rptr. 449, 454 (Ct. App. 1986) (involving an incomplete description
of voting provisions of preferred stock); supra note 100.
217. 900 F.2d 576, 577-78 (2d Cir. 1990). A "poison put" is "a provision in a bond
indenture that permits the bondholder to tender the security to the issuer at par (or at a
premium, as determined) if. (1) there is a hostile takeover proposal or (2) the bond is
downgraded by a national rating service." PussN & Ross, supra note 7, at 529.
218. The indenture set forth the following circumstances:
(a) A person or group ... shall attain the beneficial ownership ... of an
equity interest representing at least 80% of the voting power ... unless such
attainment has been approved by a majority of the Independent Directors;
(b) The Company ... consolidates or merges ... unless approved by a
majority of the Independent Directors;
(c) The Company... incurs ... any Debt... excluding ... Debt which
is authorized or ratified by a majority of the Independent Directors, immediately
after the incurrence of which the ratio of the Company's Consolidated Total Debt
to its Consolidated Capitalization exceeds .65 to 1.0.
McMahan, 900 F.2d at 577-78 (omissions in original) (quoting the indenture).
219. See id.
220. Id. at 578 (quoting the indenture).
221. See id.
222. See id.
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basis that the prospectus failed to disclose the extent to which the right
to require the repurchase of the bonds was illusory?2 3 The
bondholders alleged that referring to "Independent Directors" created
a false impression that the "Independent Directors" would not approve
a transaction, and thereby eliminate the bondholders' right to have
their bonds repurchased, when the transaction was not in the best
interests of the bondholders. 224 They further alleged that oral
statements made in selling the bonds-that the repurchase right
constituted a "protective covenant for the debentureholders"--were
misleading.225 Their theory was:
[B]y representing that this special right to tender was the key selling
feature of otherwise low-value debentures, defendants could be found
to have implied that debentureholders would be protected against
takeovers hostile to their own interests, regardless of the interests of
shareholders,
and thus to have misled plaintiffs as to the true nature of
22 6
the right.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed summary judgment in favor of the defendants on claims
alleging violation of sections 11 and 12(a)(2) and Rule lOb-5. 227 This
determination is consistent with examining the omission from the
perspective of the reasons for the omissions. It is certainly easiest for
one drafting the disclosure document to merely recreate the terms of
the contract in the disclosure document. Doing so limits potential
liability by minimizing the possibility of affirmative misstatements,
but as alleged by the McMahan plaintiffs, it may not fully disclose the
consequences of the described terms.228 Limiting the potential liability
of an issuer, at the expense of complete disclosure to prospective
purchasers, weighs in favor of a finding of actionability. The
plaintiffs' assertions in McMahan of a more malignant reason-that
the issuer affirmatively intended to offer illusory rights-are, of
course, even more suggestive of the materiality of the omission. 29
One might have some sympathy for the issuer, if the omission
resulted from the issuer's desire to limit liability by merely
transcribing the terms of the security. Issuers are required to describe
the terms of the securities being offered. 3 Issuers' obligations to
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

See id.
See id. at 580.
Id. at 581 (internal quotations omitted).
Id.
See id. at 581-82.
See id. at 578-79, 581.
See id.
See 17 C.YR. §§ 228.202,229.202 (1999).
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describe contractual obligations, however, are not limited to the
obligation to disclose the material terms of securities sold in public
offerings. An issuer is required to disclose terms of other contracts,
where material, such as relevant licenses, franchises, and
concessions;"' rights of customers to return products;

2

contracts

government; 233

commitments
terminable at the election of the
reasonably likely to result in a material change in the issuer's
liquidity;234 material commitments for capital expenditures;235
and the plan of
relationships between the issuer and affiliates;
distribution of securities being offered.237 Be it by intent or through
inadvertence, contracts frequently are either ambiguous or contain
latent consequences. If federal securities laws require the explanation
of the import of material contract terms, and the mere disclosure of the
terms of the contracts is inadequate, then an issuer can be placed in the
awkward position of disclosing that it is uncertain of the import of
various contract terms. Where ambiguity is inadvertent, one could
argue that it would be unfair to hold an issuer liable for failing to
disclose a material ambiguity. The self-interest of a finn generally will
provide adequate incentive to identify and correct undesired ambiguity
or latent consequences.
Moreover, where the relevant contract provisions are disclosed,
requiring further discussion of the significance of relevant contract
provisions could be considered unnecessary on a basis similar to that
on which some courts have held that disclosure obligations are limited
to finn-specific information.238 In the capacity of describing the
import of a disclosed contract provision, an issuer would seem to be
acting as special legal counsel to the public.
These concerns would appear particularly acute where the
omission arose from inadvertence.239 Nevertheless, issuers are subject
to strict liability for false statements in offering documents under

231. See id. §§ 228.101(b)(7),229.101(c)(1)(iv).
232. See id. § 229.101(c)(1)(vi).
233. Seeid. § 229.101(c)(1)(ix).
234. See id. § 229.303(a)(1).
235. See id. §§ 228.303(b)(1)(iii), 229.303(a)(2).
236. See id. §§ 228.404,229.404.
237. See id. §§ 228.508, 229.508.
238. See supra notes 99-123 and accompanying text.
239. Cf. Lucia v. Prospect St. High Income Portfolio, Inc., 36 F.3d 170, 172, 177 (1st
Cir. 1994) (affirming summary judgment against the plaintiffs in respect of claims that a
prospectus for junk bonds was deficient in failing to disclose that junk bond default rates
were understated (because the computations did not account for "aging" of the bonds) but not
clearly indicating whether the claims dismissed were under section 11 or section 12(a)(2)).
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section 11 of the 1933 Act, 240 notwithstanding that liability under both
section 12(a)(2) and Rule lOb-5 is dependent on some degree of
fault.2 41 That an issuer inaccurately or inadequately described the
import of a contractual provision,
despite its exercise of some care,
2 42
should not vitiate its liability.
C.

Quantification

Subparts A and B above examine generally applicable matters
concerning materiality: disclosure of firm-specific information and the
insight into the materiality of an omission provided by an examination
of the reason for the omission. This subpart examines a third general
aspect of materiality-the degree to which materiality is affected by
the extent to which one can quantify the impact of a misstatement or
omission.
Assessing materiality would be facilitated if a numerical value
could be ascribed to the misstatement or omission. 43 Some cases have
held immaterial as a matter of law readily quantifiable misstatements
or omissions having a de minimis impact. Illustrative cases have
240. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (1994) (providing that an issuer is not entitled to a due
diligence defense).
241. See id. § 771(a)(2) (Supp. III 1997) (limiting liability to those defendants unable
to prove the misstatement could not have been remedied with the exercise of reasonable
care); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 (1976) (holding that negligence is
insufficient to create liability under Rule lOb-5). Whether there is a private cause of action
under section 17(a) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1994), is unclear. See 2 HAzEN,
supranote 6, § 13.13 at 654-58 (practitioner's ed., 3d ed. 1995).
242. Harrisv. UnionElectric Co., 787 F.2d 355, 364-65 (8th Cir. 1986), would appear
to be an example. See generally Lucas v. Florida Power & Light Co., 765 F.2d 1039, 104344 (11th Cir. 1985) (affirming a judgment in favor of the issuer as to claims that the issuer,
inter alia, inadequately disclosed its ability to redeem bonds by depositing cash, in lieu of
property, into a replacement fund); Associated Builders, Inc. v. Alabama Power Co., 505 F.2d
97, 99, 102 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding that a prospectus for bonds was, as a matter of law, not
misleading, where the plaintiffs alleged that the prospectus misleadingly suggested that the
bonds could not be redeemed in anticipation of refunding at a lower interest rate); Morgan
Stanley & Co. v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 570 F. Supp. 1529, 1532-33, 1538 (S.D.N.Y.
1983) (not granting a preliminary injunction against a redemption of bonds benefiting from
protection from redemptions funded by lower-cost debt where the issuer had recently
borrowed funds at a lower cost and intended to use the proceeds of stock offerings to redeem
the bonds in question); Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 451 F. Supp.
602, 608-09 (S.D. II. 1978) (ruling in favor of the issuer on a claim under Rule 1Ob-5 that an
offering document was misleading in failing to disclose that the issuer interpreted protection
limiting refinancing with lower-cost debt as not preventing redemption with funds from a
stock offering, notwithstanding the issuer's other lower-cost borrowing, on the basis of
absence of proof of scienter), aff'd, 598 F.2d 1109 (7th Cir. 1979); cf Staff Legal Bulletin
No. 7, supra note 127, at *36-*37 (requiring that verbatim disclosure of contractual terms in
a prospectus be accompanied by an explanation of their meaning).
243. Cf.4 Loss & SELIGMAN, supranote 63, at 2080 (3d ed. 1990) ("[It is common to
urge that a statement was 'quantitatively material.").
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included the following: the failure to disclose that an additional fee
would be required to expedite delivery of proceeds at maturity of a
$102,000, six-month treasury bill otherwise available by check sent by
regular mail; 2" the characterization as transaction fees of amounts
ranging from $2.35 to $4.85, where those fees allegedly exceeded
actual costs incurred by brokers;24 the failure to disclose a claim of
less than $2,000 against a firm whose stock was being purchased for
$650,000;246 and an allegedly improper failure to write down by
almost $1.3 million the assets of a firm having quarterly net income of
$234 million.247
Yet there is no precise numerical test for assessing whether a
misstatement or omission is material.24 Moreover, quantification of
the impact is not required to assess the materiality of a
misrepresentation or omission; an inability to quantify the effects is not
necessarily fatal to a finding of materiality.249 Case law, including
Monetary Management Group of St. Louis, Inc. v. Kidder,Peabody &
Co., summarized above, identifies circumstances in which a

244. See Press v. Chemical Inv. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 532-33, 538-39 (2d Cir.

1999). But ef NoRmAN S. PosER,

BROKER-DEALER LAW AND REGULATION: PRIVATE RIGHTS

oF AcrIoN § 2.3.1, at 141 (1995) ("It may also be a breach for a brokerage firm to pay its
customers by checks drawn on geographically distant banks, a practice that delays the
customers' receipt of funds from the broker and increases the 'float' available to the broker."
(emphasis added)).
245. See Feinman v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 84 F.3d 539, 540-41 (2d Cir. 1996).
246. See Kohner v. Wechsler, No. 72 Civ. 1898, 1972 U.S. Dist LEXIS 13314, at *2,
*7 (S.D.N.Y. June 10, 1972), modifiedon othergrounds,477 F2d 666 (2d Cir. 1973).
247. See In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 E3d 696,715 (3d Cir. 1996).
248. See id. at 714 n.14; In re Kidder Peabody Sec. Litig., 10 F. Supp. 2d 398, 410
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that a jury could find material misstatements, most of which would
have individually affected the issuer's profits by less than one percent); Staff Accounting
Bulletin No. 99, supranote 87, at *7-*13; 2 Loss & SELIGMAN, supranote 63, at 677 (3d rev.
ed. 1999); 4 id. at 2080 (3d ed. 1990).
249. See Bruce A. Hiler, The SEC and the Courts' Approach to Disclosure of
Earnings Projections, Asset Appraisals, and Other Soft Information: Old Problems,
Changing Views, 46 MD. L. REv. 1114, 1175 n.260 (1987) (arguing that sole use of a
numerical criterion could not accommodate certain important factors); cf Implementation of
Section 10A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 38,387, 62
Fed. Reg. 12,743, 12,745 n.13 (Mar. 18, 1997) (stating auditors "should consider both ...
quantitative and qualitative materiality" in assessing whether an illegal action has a material
effect on the issuer's financial statements of a type that the auditors would be required to
report to the company's board); 4 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 63, at 2081 (3d ed. 1990)
(asserting that quantitative measures are inappropriate to test materiality of conflicts of
interest or criminal violations).
This question is distinct from whether information, such as matters of management
integrity, can be material, even where their impact is quantitatively immaterial. The
materiality of such issues, sometimes referenced as "qualitative materiality," is fully explored
in Ferrara et al., supra note 170.
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misstatement or omission can be material where the impact of this
inaccuracy has not been quantified.250
For example, Acacia National Life Insurance Co. v. Kay
Jewelers, Inc. involved a consent solicitation/tender offer for a series
of bonds issued by Kay Jewelers."" The tender offer was made in
connection with an agreement under which Kay Jewelers was to be
acquired. 25 2 In order to tender bonds, a bondholder was required to
consent to an amendment to the indenture eliminating a poison put-a
covenant that otherwise would have required the issuer to offer to.
repurchase all the bonds, at par plus accrued interest, upon a change in
control.2 3 The tender offer was essentially a mechanism by which an
inducement for consenting to the amendment could be offered to
bondholders. In the tender offer, an affiliate of the firm that had agreed
to purchase Kay Jewelers offered to purchase the bonds for cash, at a
price substantially above the price at which they had been trading,
although below par plus accrued interest. 54 A bondholder brought
suit, alleging, inter alia, that the prospectus under which the bonds had
been issued did not adequately describe the ability to amend the
indenture to eliminate the poison put.2 5 The court, on a motion to

250. 615 R Supp. 1217 (E.D. Mo. 1985); see supra notes 135-140 and accompanying
text (concerning misstatements of the marginability of bonds).
251. 610 N.YS.2d 209, 211 (App. Div. 1994). A consent solicitation is undertaken
where an issuer seeks to enter into a transaction that is prohibited by the covenants in one or
more series of outstanding bonds. In this process, the issuer seeks the consent of the requisite
percentage of holders of the bonds in question for an amendment or waiver of the covenants.
The requisite percentage will be specified in the indenture under which the bonds were
issued. See generally Royce de R. Barondes, An Economic Analysis of the Potentialfor
Coercion in Consent Solicitationsfor Bonds, 63 FORDHAM L. Rnv. 749, 749-50 (1994)
(describing consent solicitations).
252. SeeAcacia Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 610 N.YS.2d at 211.
253. See id.
254. See id. at 211, 213.
255. The prospectus stated:
The obligations of the Company and the rights of the Noteholders may be
modified under the Indenture with the consent of the Company and of the holders
of a majority in outstanding principal amount of the Notes issued thereunder,
provided that no reduction in the rate or extension of time of payment of interest on
the Notes, no reduction of the principal amount thereof or premium thereon, no
extension of the fixed maturity thereon, no reduction of the percentage required for
any such modification, no alteration of the redemption provisions of the Indenture,
no change with respect to the subordination provisions which adversely affects the
rights of any holder, no change in the holder's right to receive payments of the
principal of or interest thereon and to waive an existing Default and no
modification changing the currency that the Notes are payable in, will be effective
against any Noteholder without such holder's consent.
KAY JEwELERS, INc., PROSPECTUS 28 (July 28, 1989) (on file with author).
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dismiss filed by the issuer, held that the
25 6plaintiff adequately claimed a
violation of section 11 of the 1933 Act.
The value of the omission at issue in Acacia National Life
Insurance Co. is not easily quantifiable-no quantification of that
value was discussed in the opinion, which is not entirely surprising 7
One method to quantify that omission would require an assessment of
the likelihood, as of the time the bonds were issued, that there would
be a change in control of the issuer and of the market value of the
bonds at the time of a change in control. Neither of those factors could
be assessed easily.258 But because the court did not seek to quantify
the value of the omission, the case indicates that an omission is not
immaterial merely as a consequence of an inability to quantify the
value of the difference between the securities as described and the
securities as issued.
A second relevant case is Quincy Co-Operative Bank v. A.G.
Edwards & Sons, Inc., which arose from the October 1983 sale by a
broker-dealer of $500,000 in face amount of bonds. 9 Prior to the
sale, the individual broker who placed the securities falsely
represented that the bonds could not be called (i.e., prepaid) before
April 1987.260 The purchaser was further advised that any call of the
bonds at that time would require payment of 105.91% of the face
value.26 ' In fact, the issuer was authorized to call the bonds at face
value before 1987, if the issuer sold particular real estate under certain
conditions.262 Those conditions were subsequently satisfied, and the
issuer called the bonds in 1984.263
The purchaser, a bank, alleged, inter alia, that the sale violated
section 12(a)(2) of the 1933 Act." ' On the broker-dealer's motion for
256. SeeAcacia Nat'I Life lns. Co., 610 N.Y.S.2d at 213.
257. One could attempt to assign a value by comparing offering prices for bonds
containing different types of event-risk protection.
258. Alternatively, one could attempt to provide an upper bound on the materiality of
the omission by attempting to assess the value of the poison put. The decrease in value
arising from the improper description of the poison put necessarily would not be more than
the value of a poison put having the described terms. However, even if one could value
poison puts as a whole, perhaps by reference to varying interest rates on bonds issued with
different levels of "event-risk" protection, it seems highly likely that one would conclude that
event-risk protection can be material. Thus, it is unlikely one could conclude that an
inaccurate description of a poison put is necessarily immaterial.
259. 655 F Supp. 78, 82 (D. Mass. 1986).
260. Seeid. at 81.
261. Seeid.
262. See id. at 82.
263. See id.
264. See id. at 81. This transaction was a "secondary" transaction-it did not arise
from the original sale of the securities in question. See id. For reasons unrelated to the
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summary judgment, the court held that the failure to disclose the
contingent right to call the bonds upon a sale of certain real estate was
a material omission."' In reaching that holding, the court did not
attempt to ascribe a value to the undisclosed right to call the bonds.
The court summarily concluded:
Neglecting to tell the [purchaser] about the early call provision was
certainly an omission of a material fact since it was information about
which the "average prudent investor ought reasonably to be informed
before purchasing" the bonds. Whether to invest in the bonds
depended on the expected return which turned on when the bonds could
be redeemed and at what price.
...Where, as here, the facts in questionfl were so obviously

important to the [purchaser] that reasonable minds 2could
not differ as to
66
their materiality, sunimary judgment is appropriate.

materiality of the false statement, today, a lawsuit in such circumstances alleging solely a
violation of section 12(a)(2) would be unsuccessful. The United States Supreme Court
subsequently held that section 12(a)(2) of the 1933 Act does not apply to secondary sales of
securities. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 567-68, 576 (1995) (holding, "Mhe
term 'prospectus' relates to public offerings by issuers and their controlling shareholders,"
and noting agreement that the restrictions on misleading oral statements are limited to oral
statements relating to prospectuses).
265. See Quincy Co-Operative Bank, 655 F. Supp. at 82. However, there is some
somewhat contradictory precedent in a similar context. For example, Vogel v. Brown, No. 74
Civ. 2111, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6402, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 1974), involved incomplete
disclosure of the antidilution provisions in a series of convertible debentures. Debentures that
are convertible into stock typically include provisions that adjust the conversion rights in
various contexts. See generally Model Simplified Indenture, 38 Bus. LAw. 741, 765-67

(1983) (setting forth a model indenture providing various circumstances in which the
conversion rights would be adjusted). Thus, for example, if a two-for-one stock split of an
issuer's common stock occurs, it would be customary to provide that bonds convertible into
one share of the issuer's common stock before the split would be convertible thereafter into
two shares of common stock. See id. at 765-66. These provisions are similar to poison puts,
in that they provide protection to bondholders from certain extraordinary corporate actions
that otherwise would harm the bondholders.
Vogel involved a prospectus for convertible bonds that disclosed the conversion rights
were 'subject to adjustment', [and] then enumerated 'a series of exceptions to the said right
of adjustment', but omitted 'the [allegedly] material fact that a spinoff or other distribution by
[the issuer] of its assets or shares of its subsidiary companies were among those exceptions."'
Vogel, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6402, at *3 (quoting the plaintiff's complaint). The issuer
announced that it would spin off the shares of a subsidiary, see id. at *4, that is, distribute the
subsidiary's stock to shareholders of the parent corporation, giving rise to the dispute. The
court held it was not false or misleading for the prospectus to omit that a spin-off of a
subsidiary was not a circumstance giving rise to an adjustment in conversion rights, see id. at
*5-*7, which necessarily means that the omitted fact was not material.
266. Quincy Co-Operative Bank 655 F. Supp. at 84-85 (citation omitted); accord
Duming v. First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1268 (9th Cir. 1987) ('CThe parties agree that
callability of a bond is a material fact.").
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There is no significant indication in the opinion that call
protection was particularly important to the purchaser. The opinion
does note that the purchaser was reassured "several" times concerning
the call protection on the bonds.267 That the purchaser made the
inquiry several times, however, does not indicate an idiosyncratic need
for call protection-the
bonds were sold at thirteen percent above their
268
face value.
II.

APPLICATION OF GENERAL PRINCIPLES TO A FAILURE TO
DISCLOSE CONSEQUENCES OF FLIPPING

Part I discussed certain principles generally applicable to
understanding the materiality of a misstatement or omission under the
federal securities laws. In general, in order to be deemed material,
there must be a substantial likelihood that a statement or omission is
one that a reasonable investor would consider important.2 69 Although
there is some lower court precedent for the proposition that material
information is limited to information that is firm-specific, that
precedent is dubious, in light of Supreme Court authority and other
long-standing authority, and is based on assumptions not applicable in
the context of IPOs.270 Part II has further indicated that the reason for
an omission can assist in determining the materiality of information
and that an inability to quantify the impact of a misstatement or
omission need not be fatal to a finding of materiality.7 This Part
applies those principles to the particular context of a failure to disclose
in a prospectus for an IPO the adverse consequences to a purchaser
from flipping stock purchased in the IPO. For this purpose, this Part
examines the failure to disclose that the underwriter may not allow
such a purchaser to purchase in future IPOs 2"
267. See Quincy Co-OperativeBank 655 F. Supp. at 81.
268. See id. at 82.

269. See supra notes 88-97 and accompanying text.
270. See generallysupra notes 99-212 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 213-268 and accompanying text.
272. Other punishments, for example, the additional fee imposed by Wit Capital, see
supra note 18, not disclosed in the prospectus compound the potential to mislead. Those
other fees are not discussed, as information concerning their extent is less readily available.
Note, however, that, as discussed infra pp. 938-39, the fact that an investment bank discloses
to its customer the punishment that will result from flipping does not necessarily eliminate
the obligation to disclose the information in the prospectus.
Investors do not have a contractual right to participate in IPOs. Investment banks are
allowed to exercise discretion in allocating IPOs. See infra text accompanying notes 307308. This "punishment" involves changes in how investment banks would exercise this
discretion, based on whether an investor flipped in a prior IPO. One could argue that as
investors have no contractual right to participate in IPOs, investment banks need not disclose
that certain actions will affect how the investment banks will exercise their discretionary
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Liquidity Restrictions

Depriving an investor of an opportunity to purchase stock in
future IPOs eliminates its ability to earn an extraordinary (or abovemarket) return. 273
Eliminating those future opportunities is
economically equivalent to imposing a penalty, or exercise fee, on any
quick resale of stock purchased in an IPO equal to the above-market
return available from purchasing in future IPOs. Thus, one could
model these investment bank actions as being equivalent to
incorporation of an additional term in stock purchased during an
PO--the imposition of a restriction on the resale of the stock during
the blackout period, subject to an option in the holder to remove the
restriction on payment of a fee. Under this view, the fee would equal
the discounted value of the ability to earn extraordinary returns by
purchasing stock in future IPOs.
In this model, the materiality of the omission would depend on
the materiality of both the "fee" and the right to resell stock during the
blackout period. The excessive returns available from flipping IPOs
indicates that the fee is material. It is simply implausible that an
investor aware of these excessive returns would not find an inability to
purchase in subsequent IPOs to be important. More difficult is
assessing the materiality of requiring that any flipping be done after
the blackout period.274
A first step in assessing the materiality of the omission of
restrictions on flipping IPO securities is to attempt to quantify the
value of the undisclosed restrictions. Unfortunately, the methodology
authority. The test of materiality, however, does not support that view. The TSC Industries
test, by its terms, does not limit materiality to changes in contractual rights. Cf Account
Management Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 36,314, 60 SEC Docket 962, 963-64 (Sept
29, 1995) (accepting an investment adviser's offer of settlement concerning a failure to
disclose a practice of allocating hot IPOs to favored accounts).
Moreover, this discretion in allocating shares in IPOs is not unfettered. There are limits
on the ability of an investment bank to condition an allocation of IPO securities on other
actions. See generally Sanders v. Gardner, 7 F. Supp. 2d 151, 164 n.10 (E.D.N.Y. 1998)
(describing as manipulative, fraudulent, or deceptive a broker's requiring an investor to agree
to purchase in the aftermarket as a condition to being allocated securities in an IPO).
273. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
274. Outside the context of federal securities law, support for this conclusion is
provided by the Uniform Commercial Code, which conditions the enforceability of transfer
restrictions imposed by an issuer on its certificated securities upon either actual knowledge of
the security holder or the prominent reference to the restrictions on the certificate. See
U.C.C. § 8-204(1) (1998).
The absence of a de minimis exception indicates the
importance-the materiality-of restrictions on transfer. Of course, the actions of
underwriters are not actions by an issuer and may not necessarily impede the sale of stock
purchased in an IPO-such a sale may merely have adverse consequences in respect of
transactions in other securities.
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to value such a restriction is not clear. There is some empirical
evidence, however, that bears on this issue. Professor William Silber
has examined the price
at which "restricted" stock is sold relative to
"unrestricted" stock.2 75 Restricted stock is stock that has been
acquired, directly or indirectly, from the issuer or an affiliate of the
issuer in a transaction, or a series of transactions, not involving a
public offering.276 The liquidity of the stock is therefore impaired,
because it cannot be resold absent either registration of the sale under
the 1933 Act or the availability of an exemption from that registration
requirement, such
as Rule 144,277 section 4(1) of the 1933 Act,2 78 or
279
"section 4(1

2)."

Professor Silber found that restricted stock was sold by issuers in
private placements, on average, at approximately a one-third discount
to the public market price for the stock. 8° That evidence strongly
supports the conclusion that it is material to omit the fact that stock
being sold is restricted. Case law, not relying on this empirical
evidence, is to a similar effect, including cases addressing: the failure
to disclose that stock is restricted;281 a false statement that stock being
sold is not restricted;282 misstatements concerning intentions to register
275. See William L. Silber, Discounts on Restricted Stock- The Impact of Illiquidity
on Stock Prices,FIN. ANALYSTS J., July/Aug. 1991, at 60, 60 (finding private placements of
stock, in a sample of 69 issuers, were, on average, at a 33.75% discount from the price at
which the stock traded publicly); cf.Michael Hertzel & Richard L. Smith, Market Discounts
and Shareholder Gains for Placing Equity Privately, 48 J.FIN. 459, 478 tbl.VI (1993)
(finding average discounts of about 35% for placements of up to $25 million, decreasing to
single percentage points for offerings above $75 million). Two finance theorists, however,
have argued that any such discrepancy may be attributable, at least in part, to factors other
than a decrease in value arising from absence of liquidity. See id.at 460 ("[P]rivate
placement discounts reflect costs incurred by private investors to assess firm value ....
").
See generally Rowe v. Maremont Corp., 850 F.2d 1226, 1235-36 (7th Cir. 1988) (affirming a
judgment in a bench trial and stating that a purchaser's willingness to purchase a substantial
block of restricted stock at the prevailing per share market price was not inconsistent with
holding that sellers reasonably relied on a buyer's misstatements and omissions concerning
intentions to seek control of the issuer).
276. See 17 C.FR. § 230.144(a)(3) (1999) (defining the term "restricted securities").
277. Id. § 230.144.
278. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(l) (1994).
279. This term is used to reference exempt resales in private placements by persons
who could be considered underwriters. See 1 HAZEN, supra note 6, § 4.26.1, at 295-97
(practitioner's ed., 3d ed. 1995).
280. See Silber, supra note 275, at 60.
281. See Korber v. Lehman, 245 N.Y.S.2d 830, 831-32 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
282. See Stone v. Fossil Oil & Gas, 657 F. Supp. 1449, 1459-60 (D.N.M. 1987)
(finding defendants liable for violating section 12(a)(2) of the 1933 Act for selling restricted
stock by means of a false representation that the stock was registered). If the stock being sold
in a transaction has never been sold in a registered transaction but it can be freely resold by
the purchaser without registration, a failure to disclose that the stock had never been sold in a
registered transaction would be immaterial, as that fact would imply no legal consequences.

HeinOnline -- 74 Tul. L. Rev. 933 1999-2000

934

TULANE LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 74:883

the stock;2" 3 and an issuer's representation that it would take steps to
secure an exemption under Regulation A for a subsequent resale of
securities being sold, while failing to disclose a criminal conviction of
of the issuer that made the issuer ineligible for Regulation
a promoter
84
A.

2

Although case law and empirical evidence indicate that a failure
to disclose that stock being sold is restricted may be material, that
precedent does not compel the conclusion that limiting the ability to
flip stock purchased in an IPO would be material. The time periods
are not comparable. The process of registering stock can take months
and requires additional expenditures. An exemption from registration
under Rule 144 typically requires that the seller has held the security
for at least one year.28 This authority thus directly supports the
actionability of omissions more significant than those at issue in
flipping IPO securities, but leaves unresolved the materiality of the
restrictions imposed on persons purchasing in IPOs.
As an alternative, one can examine case law assessing the
materiality of matters that would appear to have a lesser impact on a
potential purchaser than the restrictions imposed in IPOs. Such an
examination is necessarily imprecise. Reasonable minds could differ
as to the relative importance of different types of information.
Nevertheless, this approach represents the best alternative.
Of the various cases assessing materiality discussed above, the
alleged deficiencies at issue in McMahan & Co. v. Wherehouse
Entertainment,Inc. 286 and Acacia NationalLife Insurance Co. v. Kay
Jewelers, Inc. 2 7 appear most relevant. Both cases involved accurate
descriptions of rights applicable in a contingency; in each case, the
description, although literally accurate, omitted a discussion of actions
that could be taken to frustrate the rights that appeared to be granted.
See Murray v. Thompson McKinnon Auchincloss, Kohlmeyer, Inc., No. 76 Civ. 3028, 1981
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10991, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 1981); Northrop v. duPont, 173 S.E.2d
839, 842 (Va. 1970).
283. See Ohashi v. Veit Indus., 536 F.2d 849, 851-54 (9th Cir. 1976) (reversing a
dismissal for failure to state a claim, where the plaintiff alleged the seller of securities
misrepresented efforts to remove transfer restrictions on restricted stock); American Mobile
Communications, Inc. v. Nationwide Cellular Ser., Inc., No. 91 Civ. 3587, 1992 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13156, at *9, *14-*15 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 1992) (denying a motion to dismiss under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) claims that persons involved in selling restricted
securities violated section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), by failing to disclose an
intent to dishonor an obligation promptly to register the securities).
284. See Moore v. Gorman, 75 F. Supp. 453,454-56 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). Regulation A is
currently set forth at 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-.263 (1999).

285. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(d)(1) (1999).
286. 900 F2d 576 (2d Cir. 1990).
287. 610 N.Y.S.2d 209 (App. Div. 1994).
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As discussed above, one alleged deficiency at issue in McMahan arose
from a defined term--"Independent Directors"-that was allegedly
misleading in creating the impression that the "Independent Directors"
would act on behalf of the bondholders.28 Acacia National Life
Insurance Co. involved the failure to disclose the manner in which the
provisions of an indenture governing amendments to the indenture,
which28 9were fully summarized, could be used to terminate a "poison
put.

In both cases, the court indicated that these matters could be
material. 290 Both seem to involve matters less material than the
restrictions on flipping IPOs. They both pertain to rights applicable in
certain contingent events. The restrictions on flipping securities
acquired in an IPO, on the other hand, limit a choice that would
otherwise be freely available to a shareholder and that shareholders
frequently exercise-as noted above, all aftermarket trading in stock in
the weeks immediately following an IPO by definition is in shares that
have been flipped.
Additionally, the disclosure in McMahan and Acacia National
Life Insurance Co. appears less misleading than disclosure omitting
the consequences of flipping. The disclosure documents in McMahan
and Acacia NationalLife Insurance Co. addressed the relevant topic
and were literally accurate. IPO prospectuses, on the other hand, are
silent concerning the consequences of flipping stock acquired in an
IPO.
This analysis is necessarily imprecise. That is the nature of the
inquiry. Nevertheless, this precedent implies that it would at least be a
jury question to determine the materiality of an omission from a
prospectus for an IPO of the consequences of flipping.
Whether such an omission would be material as a matter of law is
a more difficult question. That restricted stock trades on the order of a
one-third discount2 suggests that the value one could ascribe to a
thirty-day limitation on the sale of stock could be on the order of single
percentage points or lower. In 1991, Rule 144 allowed resale of
restricted securities, in broker transactions and in limited amounts,
after a two-year holding period.29 2 If one assumes that there is a linear
288. See supranotes 217-229 and accompanying text.
289. See supranotes 251-256 and accompanying text.
290. See supranotes 227,256 and accompanying text.
29 1. See Silber, supra note 275, at 60.
292. From 1972 to 1997, the applicable holding period for resales subject to volume
restrictions was two years. See Revision of Holding Period Requirements in Rules 144 and
145, Securities Act Release No. 7390, 62 Fed. Reg. 9242, 9242 (Feb. 28, 1997).

HeinOnline -- 74 Tul. L. Rev. 935 1999-2000

TULANE LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 74:883

relationship between the period over which securities cannot be sold
and the value of the restriction, that would imply an estimated value on
the order of a few percentage points for the right to resell stock over
the immediately following thirty days.293 Nevertheless, an omission
implicating a change in value on the order of one percentage point
would seem material in the context of a large institutional purchase of
securities.
As noted above, additional insight into materiality in some cases
can be realized by reviewing the reasons for the misstatement or
omission.294 The reasons why prospectuses do not include this
information are not entirely clear. As indicated above, prospectuses
currently disclose the possibility of penalty bids-punishment that
may be imposed on an underwriter that places IPO securities that are
flipped.29 The disclosure of that aspect of the offering process appears
to have been the result of explicit SEC rule making, which in 1996,
effective early 1997, required that IPO prospectuses disclose, if
applicable, the possibility that penalty bids would be imposed.296 The
practice of using penalty bids preceded this rule.297 Nevertheless,
disclosure of the practice in the prospectus seems not to have occurred
prior to that rule. The first prospectus or preliminary prospectus
referencing penalty bids in EDGAR, the SEC's electronic filing
system, was filed in February 1997.298 Yet even today, the disclosure
is not what could be described as "full." The illustrative disclosure set
forth above merely identifies the possibility that there may be penalty
bids.299 It conveys no information bearing on the likelihood of penalty
bids. Moreover, the focus of the disclosure is directed at the impact
penalty bids may have on the market price of the affected security.
There are a number of plausible reasons why prospectuses do not
disclose this information: First,the issuer may not be independently
293. The estimated value of the right to resell can be computed as follows:
30
=.014
.33
365x2
294. See supra notes 213-242 and accompanying text.
295. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
296. See Anti-Manipulation Rules Conceming Securities Offerings, Securities Act
Release No. 7375, 62 Fed. Reg. 520, 543 (Jan. 3, 1997) (adding 17 C.F.R. §§ 228.508G),
229.508(o).
297. See supra note 16.
298.. Search of LEXIS, Fedsec Library, Reg File (July 27, 1999) (search terms were
"(penalty w/3 bid) and date(<3/l/97)') (locating THERMEDICS DETECION INC., AMENDMENT
No. 1 TO REGISTRATION STATEMENT ON FoRM S-1, at 57 (Feb. 5, 1997) (referencing penalty
bids)). It is possible that one or more prospectuses filed in paper form before February 6,
1997, referenced "penalty bids."
299. See supra text accompanying note 26.
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aware of the practice, and the underwriters may not advise the issuer
of the practice. 3"
Second, disclosing this information on an underwriter-specific
level could lead to competition among underwriters on this basis.
Ceteris paribus, a prospective purchaser would prefer to purchase
stock in an IPO from an underwriter who would not punish that
purchaser for flipping stock. Omitting the information inhibits
competition on this basis, because it is not easy for a prospective
purchaser to acquire the information from each syndicate participant.
Moreover, making those inquiries may signal a likelihood that the
prospective purchaser is more likely to flip stock, which can be
expected to diminish the willingness of underwriters to place stock
with that prospective purchaser.
Third, the practice may not be disclosed merely because it is not
practicable to do so. Underwriters are not required to impose these
punishments on customers. It is entirely plausible that, at the time the
prospectus for a particular offering is drafted, the underwriters may not
know the extent, if any, to which they would punish those who flip the
IPO securities in question. Moreover, disclosing this information in
respect of the entire underwriting syndicate could be logistically
difficult. Members of an underwriting syndicate who are neither
managers nor comanagers typically do not send employees to
meetings in which the registration statement is drafted. The recent,
very large IPO for Conoco Inc. included forty-one underwriters in the
United States, in addition to the international underwriters.3 " This
large number of underwriters, in addition to the other participating
brokers, may substantially impede disclosure of the relevant
information.
Were the information disclosed on an investment-bank-specific
basis, so that there would be different information provided in respect
of each investment bank, the disclosure would be of limited benefit
unless it were disclosed in the preliminary prospectus required to be
circulated before the offering. "°
Yet a preliminary prospectus
generally does not include the entire underwriting syndicate300. Underwriters' counsel usually is primarily responsible for preparing the plan-ofdistribution section of a prospectus. See D'Alimonte & Schechter, supranote 66, app. B at
320 (identifying those portions of a prospectus describing the plan of distribution as being
provided on behalf of the underwriters).
301. See CONOCOINC., supra note 133, at 127.
302. Rule 15c2-8 under the 1934 Act, 17 C.F.R. § i40.15c2-8 (1999), requires the
delivery of a preliminary prospectus to a person expected to receive a confirmation of a sale
of securities in an IPO. The preliminary prospectus is required to be delivered at least 48
hours before sending a confirmation of a sale. See id. § 240.15c2-8(b).
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typically, only the managing underwriter and the comanagers are
listed. Thus, disclosure of this information on an investment bankspecific basis is inhibited by customary syndicate-building methods.
Fourth, the information may be omitted because underwriters
would prefer to avoid publicizing the disparity in treatment between
individual investors and institutional investors. Detailed disclosure
would presumably indicate the extent to which the punishment is
imposed on individual and institutional investors. A desire to avoid
publicizing this disparate treatment is entirely understandable.
Adverse regulatory consequences could result.
The first possible rationale is consistent with the actionability of
the omission under section 11 against the issuer. An omission born of
the issuer's ignorance is consistent with liability, because the issuer's
liability under section 11 is strict.30 3 Since the underwriters are aware
of the omission, they would have no due diligence defense under
section 12(a)(2) or absence of scienter for purposes of Rule 1Ob-5.
The second possible rationale, to avoid competition among
underwriters, also would support the materiality of the omission. That
rationale would represent a desire to take advantage of market
inefficiency as part of a process designed to deprive investors of
certain rights they otherwise would have. When the federal regulatory
scheme relies on disclosure, in lieu of more intrusive regulation, on the
theory that market forces functioning in an environment of full
disclosure will protect investors, including unsophisticated investors,
omissions made for purposes of suppressing market competition are
fundamentally material.
One aspect of varying treatment by various underwriters merits
brief exposition. Investors choose the investment banks that they use
to make their investments. They need not use only one investment
bank. Consider an investor contemplating an investment in an IPO
through one of two investment banks, one of which imposed a penalty
on flipping and the other of which did not. If an investor who sought
to invest in IPOs had complete information, ceteris paribus,it could
well decide to make the investment through the investment bank that
promised no punishment if the investor flipped the stock. That is, this
information could determine the choice of the investment bank
selected.
That disclosure could change an investment decision-in this
case, by changing the investment bank used-does not compel the
conclusion that the information is material. That argument would
303. See supra note 240 and accompanying text.
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prove too much. At a theoretical level, a variation of $10 on a
$100,000 investment might be similarly detenministic. Given two
choices identical but for $10, few would intentionally forego the $10.
However, trivial amounts can nevertheless be immaterial?"4 At some
level, trivial amounts are lost in the "noise" component of information
available to investors. The more appropriate view is whether one can
envision flly informed actual investors in practice choosing between
brokers in whole or in part on the basis of the varying punishment
imposed as a result of flipping, and one would expect so.
The third possible rationale could militate against the materiality
of the omission, were there no practicable method by which this
information could be disclosed. However, the information could
practicably be conveyed by the underwriter to its customer on or
before the time preliminary prospectuses are disseminated.305 Were
the identical information disclosed outside the prospectus, its omission
from the prospectus would seem benign (absent a desire to limit
competition on this basis). It is difficult to ascertain the extent to
which this information is disclosed to prospective purchasers by the
underwriters themselves, because those communications need not be
made publicly available.
The import of the fourth possible rationale--fear of future
regulatory revision-is ambiguous. Regulatory reform arising from
public pressure need not be rational. That an industry would prefer not
to present a possible focus that could cause public concern to coalesce
does not necessarily bear on the merits of the activities that could
become subject to increased scrutiny.
A review of the possible rationales for these omissions is not
dispositive; some but not all would imply that additional disclosure is
required. None, however, would clearly negate a finding of
materiality.
B.

Conclusions ConcerningLiquidity Restrictions

The element of the plan of distribution, the description of which
is omitted from prospectuses, is equivalent to a limitation on transfer,
subject to a right to pay for a transfer in exchange for a fee of an
uncertain value. This relationship is similar to a term of a security, and
the materiality of its omission can be examined from the perspective of
the materiality of the omission of the equivalent security term.

304. See supra notes 244-247 and accompanying text.
305. See supra note 302.
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There is no incontrovertible, conclusive analysis of the
materiality of a similar security term. Yet some of the most persuasive
evidence is the trading volume that takes place during that period. The
existence of this trading strongly suggests the right to resell should be
considered material.
Terms of securities traditionally have been fully disclosed in
offering documents, in part because counsel responsible for the
drafting does not wish to take responsibility for assessing the extent to
which omitting a particular term results in a material omission. One
could argue that ease of description should probably not affect one's
conclusion concerning whether the omission of information is
material. There is a virtually infinite amount of information
concerning an issuer and its securities that could be provided to a
prospective investor. Every investor would find it necessary that the
information to be conveyed be limited or filtered in some way. The
amount of information that can be processed by an investor in making
a decision is finite. In that light, that information can be simply
conveyed would support its disclosure, as ease of comprehension
should increase the likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would
process the relevant information, increasing the likelihood that a
reasonable shareholder would consider it "important."
A partial description could be easily provided. One example of
that type of disclosure is as follows:
The managing underwriter has advised the issuer that the underwriters
may decline to sell securities in subsequent initial public offerings to
persons who resell within thirty days stock purchased in the initial
public offering made by this prospectus. A prospective purchaser
contemplating selling within thirty days securities purchased in this
offering should obtain information from its brokerage firm concerning
its applicable policies, prior to purchasing the securities being offered
by this prospectus.
Because some relevant information concerning these practices can be
provided in a few lines, a bias in favor of some disclosure of the
relationship is appropriate.
A more revealing prospectus discussion, addressing the extent to
which the specific underwriters enforce these provisions, would be
more difficult to provide. However, it seems unlikely that competitive
forces could be brought to bear on these disparate practices absent a
requirement that there be collected in a single place the various
policies of investment banks on punishing customers who flip. The
effort required of individual investors to check with various
investment banks is prohibitive. Moreover, making that inquiry may
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signal a likelihood of flipping, which could result in the investor who
makes the investigation not being allocated a portion of an IPO. As
investment banks do not impose these restrictions uniformly,
competitive forces at the institutional level may not inure to the benefit
of retail investors.
The federal securities laws regulating public offerings reflect an
intentional choice to avoid "merit" regulation. Rather, they focus on
requiring full disclosure, leaving it to market forces to achieve the
desirable outcomes. In that context, it is not appropriate to argue
against assembling the relevant information in a single place-the
prospectus-on the basis that disclosing this information would be
costly, where a failure to assemble the information in the prospectus
would not be remedied by competitive forces.
C. DisparateTreatment ofInvestors
As noted above, it has been reported that underwriters do not
treat equally investors who wish to flip securities purchased in IPOs. °6
Favored customers are more likely to be permitted to participate in
subsequent IPOs, whereas disfavored customers, particularly
individual customers, are more likely to have their relationship with
their brokerage firm disadvantaged as a consequence of flipping IPO
securities. This disparate treatment presents additional issues.
There is sparse authority addressing whether the mere disparate
treatment of customers of a brokerage firm is, by itself, actionable.
The process by which securities are allocated in IPOs manifests
disparate treatment. Favored customers are allocated more shares. 0 7
This fact, by itself, is not actionable, although favoring affiliates of the
underwriter or the issuer could be actionable." 8
One could argue, based on tangentially relevant authority
concerning the settlement of administrative proceedings, that a
306. See supra text accompanying notes 22-23.
307. Cf 1 HAzEN, supra note 6, § 6.2, at 87 (practitioner's ed., 3d ed. Supp. 1999)
("As a result of these and other ways in which firms favor their larger customers, most
investors do not have access to hot issues in the new issues market.').
308. See 1 id. § 6.2, at 360 (practitioner's ed., 3d ed. 1995). Allocating shares to
persons likely to direct future business to the broker also may be unlawful. See supranote 6.
In addition, discriminatory allocation of "hot" IPOs by a registered investment adviser to
particular accounts may be unlawful. See McKenzie Walker Inv. Management, Inc.,
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1571, 62 SEC Docket 1010, 1010-11 (July 16, 1996)
(accepting an offer of settlement conceming a disparate allocation of hot IPOs in favor of
accounts paying the adviser performance-based fees); Account Management Corp.,
Exchange Act Release No. 36,314, 60 SEC Docket 962, 963-64 (Sept. 29, 1995) (accepting
an offer of settlement concerning a failure to disclose a practice of allocating hot IPOs to
favored accounts).
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broker's inconsistent imposition of penalties for flipping, by itself, is
actionable. For example, the SEC accepted an offer of settlement
involving Merrill Lynch's disclosure to favored customers of
nonpublic information acquired by its employees during the course of
preparing to underwrite a public offering.30 9 The SEC accepted
Merrill Lynch's offer of settlement of administrative proceedings
alleging violation of antifraud provisions of the 1933 Act and the 1934
Act.31° In accepting the offer of settlement, the SEC stated: "And,
aggravating the inherent unfairness of the disclosure to certain
customers was the fact that, at the same time, [the] registrant was
effecting purchases of the stock for other customers to whom the
adverse information was not available."3 1"
This settlement provides only minor support for the actionability
of disparate treatment of investors who flip stock purchased in IPOs.
It indicates that, in the SEC's view, disparate treatment of investors can
increase the likelihood that an activity would be considered fraudulent
and therefore actionable. But it does not by any means compel the
conclusion that disparate treatment of investors in IPOs is fraudulent
and actionable. Other authority is provided by attorney Arnold Jacobs,
who asserts that it violates Rule lOb-5 for a broker-dealer to "deliver[]
securities to preferred customers when the broker is not
in compliance
312
with the SEC's capital requirements and is insolvent.
309. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc., Exchange Act Release No.
8459, availablein 1968 SEC LEXIS 261, at *4-*5 (Nov. 25, 1968).
310. Seeid.at*2-*4.
311. Id.at *9.
312. 5C ARNOLD S. JACOBS, LmGATION AND PRACTICE UNDER RULE 10B-5 § 212.04,
at 9-184 (2d ed. 1981 & Release #55 Dec. 1997). Yet the cited authority for this proposition,
Doores Sec. Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 10,342, 2 SEC Docket 291, 291 (Aug. 15,
1973), is not compelling, because it is merely an announcement of the institution of
administrative proceedings, which were subsequently settled without explicit reference to this
particular issue. See Doores Sec. Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 10,577, 3 SEC Docket
304, 305 (Dec. 28, 1973).
Other tangential authority is provided by Lehman Brothers Inc., Exchange Act Release
No. 36,104, 59 SEC Docket 2567, 2568, 2571 (Aug. 15, 1995), in which the SEC censured
Lehman Brothers for actions taken in bidding for preferred stock bearing dividends at a rate
reset periodically by Dutch auction. Lehman Brothers violated the bidding procedures
pertaining to the resetting of the dividend rates, which were outlined in the prospectus. See
id. at 2570. These violations had the effect, inter alia, of giving preferential treatment to
clients of Lehman Brothers. See id. at 2568-70. The SEC, in censuring Lehman Brothers,
stated that in favoring Lehman Brothers' clients, Lehman Brothers' practices "involved the
making of false statements in connection with the purchase of securities, in violation of...
Rule lob-5." Id. at 2570. As Rule lOb-5 renders unlawful only the making of materially
misleading statements, this language indicates disparate treatment of customers, at least in
this context, could be material. Dissemination of a misleading immaterial statement would
not violate Rule lOb-5. See 2 HAzEN, supra note 6, § 13.5A, at 506 (practitioner's ed., 3d ed.
1995).
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However, this disparate treatment of customers who purchase in
IPOs may violate NASD rules and such a violation could provide
persuasive evidence that this practice is fraudulent. Specifically,
NASD Rule 2740 limits the ability of an investment bank participating
in a fixed price offering, the normal method by which substantial IPOs
are offered,"' to share with a purchaser a portion of the commission
earned for participating in the offering.3 14 The Rule provides:
In connection with the sale of securities which are part of a fixed price
offering:
(a) A member may not grant or receive selling concessions,
discounts, or other allowances except as consideration for services
rendered in distribution and may not grant such concessions, discounts
or other allowances to anyone other than a broker or dealer actually
engaged in the investment banking or securities business; provided,
however, that nothing in this Rule shall prevent any member from
(1)selling any such securities to any person, or account managed by
any person, to whom it has provided or will provide bona fide research,
if the stated public offering price for such securities is paid by the
purchaser;, or (2) selling any such securities owned by him to any
person at any net price which
may be fixed by him unless prevented
315
therefrom by agreement.
This provision limits the ability of an investment bank
participating in the distribution of an IPO to place the securities, in the
initial distribution, at varying net prices. It prevents an investment
bank from reallowing to anyone other than a broker-dealer any portion
of its commission for participating in the distribution. 316 The rules also
proscribe indirect reallowances, by banning contracts between the
investment bank and the customer for other products or services at
prices to the customer below full compensation.317
313. See supra text accompanying note 11.
314. See NASD MANUAL, supra note 65, Rule 2740.
315. Id. Rule 2740(a).
316. See id. IM-2740.
317. See id. According to the NASD Manual:
A member who, itself or through its affiliate, supplies another person with services or
products which fail to qualify as bona fide research, or which, in the case of services or

products other than bona fide research, are provided by the member or its affiliate to
such person or others for cash or for some other agreed upon consideration, and also
retains or receives selling concessions, discounts or other allowances from purchases by
that person or its affiliate of securities from a fixed price offering is improperly granting
a selling concession, discount or other allowance to that person unless the member or its
affiliate has been, or has arranged and reasonably expects to be, fully compensated for
such services or products from sources other than the selling concession, discount or
allowance retained or received on the sale.
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The disparate enforcement by investment banks of punishment
for flipping IPO securities could, and, it can be argued, should, be
considered to violate these provisions. There is no consideration,
necessarily not fair value, provided by the favored purchasers who are
released from any punishment for flipping. The favored purchasers
are essentially compensated for participating in the distribution, which
appears to be at the core of the type of conduct proscribed by this Rule.
The exception
for "bona fide research" would not apply to this factual
318
pattern.
There also is a nebulous NASD rule potentially violated by this
activity in IPOs. Rule 2110 provides, "A member, in the conduct of
his business, shall observe high standards of commercial honor and
just and equitable principles of trade."3 9 It has been recently disclosed
that underwriters may allocate a portion of an IPO to persons expected
to be able to influence the choices that other corporations make in
future IPOs. 320 The NASD has issued a notice to members indicating
that such allocations may violate NASD rules, unless the broker-dealer
can demonstrate the following:
[he securities were sold to such persons in accordance with their
normal investment practice, . . . the aggregate of the securities so sold is

insubstantial and not disproportionate in amount as compared to sales
to members of the public and ...the amount sold to any one of such

persons is insubstantial in amount.321
This notice to members could signal a heightened concern by the
NASD over disparate treatment of investors in IPOs. Rule 2110
appears sufficiently flexible to permit the NASD to impose discipline
for disparate treatment of investors in IPOs, were the NASD inclined
to do so, regardless of the applicability of Rule 2740. Moreover, this
Rule could be applied even though the practice is common.322
318. The NASD has manifested a restrictive interpretation of the safe harbor for
research. According to NASD staff, the exception for "services in distribution" or "bona fide
research" does not extend to the broker-dealer's provision of "securities custodial, clearance
and settlement services." See Lee A. Pickard, NASD Interpretive Letter (Dec. 9, 1997)
(visited Jan. 24,2000) <http://www.nasdr.com/2910/2740_02.htm>.
319. NASD MANuAL, supra note 65, Rule 2110.
320. See supra text accompanying note 6.
321. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., NASD Reminds Members of Obligations
Under Free-Riding and Withholding Interpretation, NASD Notice to Members No. 97-91,
available in 1997 NASD LEXIS 110, at *2-*3 (1997) (quoting NASD MANUAL, supranote
65, IM- 2110-1 (b)(5)).
322. Cf Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 135 E3d 266, 273-74
(3d Cir. 1998) (holding ajury could determine that a broker-dealer was required, in executing
customer transaction orders, to utilize various sources over and above those typically used in
the industry, stating, "Even a universal industry practice may still be fraudulent."), cert.
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A review of NASD Rules 2110 and 2740 indicates that there is
adequate authority for the NASD to take action against investment
banks solely on the basis of discriminatory enforcement of
punishments on those who flip securities purchased in an IPO. A
strong case can be made that Rule 2740 proscribes this conduct. And,
even if that Rule did not prohibit this conduct, the NASD, were it
inclined to do so, could use Rule 2110 in this context. That an
administrative enforcement action is available does not necessarily
mean private parties would have a basis for a remedy. The current
trend is to hold that violations of NASD rules do not, by themselves,
give rise to a private cause of action.3 23 However, violation of an
NASD rule may shed light on the contours of other ambiguous
obligations. Professors Louis Loss and Joel Seligman state, "[T]here
is the possibility also of the court's considering applicable selfregulatory organization rules in measuring a member's duty in a
common law action.' 324 Similarly, that a practice is sufficiently
significant to be prohibited by an NASD rule suggests that a failure to
disclose the practice, in a context where there is a duty to disclose all
material information-where there is a duty to speak-should be
material and therefore actionable.
Significant changes were made to the NASD rules as a result of
the decision in Papilsky v. Berndt.32 5 As a consequence of that case,
the NASD proposed a number of revisions to its rules of fair practice

denied, 119 S. Ct. 44 (1998); Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167, 1171 (2d Cir.
1970); SEC v. Rauscher Pierce Refsnes, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 2d 985, 1001 (D. Ariz. 1998).
323. See 2 HAzEN, supra note 6, § 10.14, at 141 (practitioner's ed., 3d ed. 1995); 9
Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 63, at 4444 (3d ed. 1992). See generally Eunice A.
Eichelberger, Annotation, Private Federal Right of Action Against Brokerage Firm for
Violation of Exchange or Dealer Association Rule, 54 A.L.R. FED. 11 (1981) (collecting
cases). That the rule in question is a "catch-all" rule, such as NASD Rule 2110, militates
against the rule, by itself, giving rise to a private cause of action. See Colonial Realty Corp.
v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 182 (2d Cir. 1966). Although this principle, as expressed in
Colonial Realty Corp., would seem to remain viable, the general framework for analyzing
implied rights of action was subsequently reworked by the United States Supreme Court,
commencing with Cortv. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
324. 9 Loss & SELImMAN, supranote 63, at 4446 (3d ed. 1992); cf Grandon v. Merrill
Lynch & Co., 147 F.3d 184, 193 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that a court should reference the
rules of a self-regulatory organization, the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, defming
excessive markups in determining whether a markup was excessive in violation of Rule lOb5); United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1298 (2d Cir. 1991) ("[W]e decline to hold that
the information required to be disclosed in 13D is material per se for purposes of § 10(b)
simply because such disclosure is required under the securities laws. But the fact that the
information is required to be revealed under § 13(d) is evidence of its materiality").
325. No. 71 Civ. 2534, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14442 (S.D.N.Y June 24, 1976).

HeinOnline -- 74 Tul. L. Rev. 945 1999-2000

946

TULANE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 74:883

in 1977.326 The proposals were subsequently amended and became
effective upon approval by the SEC.327 In approving the revisions, the
SEC described the reasons the NASD identified for changes now set
forth in Rule 2740:
The NASD stated that this section was intended (i) to prevent unfair
discrimination against customers who were not able to generate
sufficient business to receive products or services that could be offset
by selling concessions and (ii) to prevent misrepresentations by
members that the public offering price was fixed when in fact certain
customers had received a discount.328
The second rationale identifies a belief that certain acts to be
proscribed by the rules, as amended, were not consistent with a "fixed
price" offering, as that term would be understood by purchasers. That
is, it would be misleading to describe as a "fixed price" offering one
that included those activities to be proscribed. This background, then,
indicates that if the actions of brokers in attempting to restrain flipping
by disfavored customers violate NASD Rule 2740, the failure to
disclose those practices would be material as a matter of law.
Additional authority, independent of the applicability of NASD
rules, indicates the materiality of a failure to disclose varying terms on
which securities offered are being sold. One such case is Schott v.
Maidsville Coal Mining Partnership,which arose from the sale of
limited partnership interests to a variety of purchasers, including the
plaintiff.329 As part of the sale of partnership interests, the corporate
parent of the sole general partner, apparently without additional
compensation,33 granted "puts" to some purchasers.331 These puts
provided some purchasers the right to require the corporate parent of
the limited partnership to repurchase the limited partnership interests.
The plaintiff, however, was not offered or given a put.332
After making its purchase, the plaintiff became aware of the puts
granted to other investors when he received a letter indicating that the
partnership's accounting firm was of the view that the issuance of puts
326. See National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 17,371, 45
Fed. Reg. 83,707, 83,707-08 (Dec. 12, 1980). The numbering of NASD rules was
substantially revised subsequent to the decision in Papilsky. For ease of exposition, this
Article refers to NASD rules under their current designations.
327. See id. at 83,723.
328. Id. at 83,713.
329. No. 78 Civ. 6248, 1979 U.S. Dist LEXIS 9965, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 1979),
aft'd, 636 F.2d 1204 (2d Cir. 1980).

330. The opinion is not entirely clear on this point; it merely indicates that some
interests "were being sold with an option to resell." Id. at *2.
331. Seeid.
332. Seeid.at*3.
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"raises questions as to the fairness of presentation" of the partnership's
audited financial statements. 33 The plaintiff subsequently brought
suit, alleging, inter alia, a violation of section 12(a)(2)." 4
In discussing the materiality of the omission, and granting the
purchaser summary judgment on a claim under section 12(a)(2), the
court stated:
Under the TSC test, we are to ask only whether or not the knowledge
that some limited partners in the Partnership could sell their interests at
will would have assumed actual significance in the deliberations of the
reasonable Partnership investor at the time the plaintiff purchased his
Partnership units. The self-evident answer to that question is "yes," and
none of 33the
facts alleged by the defendants suggest a contrary
5
response.
One significant element of this case is that the omitted
information had no direct bearing on the value of the investment.336 It
would not be unusual for a limited partnership agreement to allow the
admission of an assignee of a limited partnership interest upon the
consent of the general partner.337 Thus, it is not uncommon for,limited
partners not to have a right to require that unaffiliated persons maintain
333. Id. at *3-*4.

334. See id. at *4.
335. Id. at *7-*5 (citation omitted) (emphasis added); accord Hidell v. International
Diversified Invs., 520 F.2d 529, 533, 535-36 (7th Cir. 1975) (holding that the omission of a
put granted to one of eight investors, who had provided $25,000 of $190,000 invested, was
material, where the funds to effect the repurchase were ultimately provided to the corporation
by another investor); ef Valente v. PepsiCo, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 1228, 1235, 1244-45 (D. Del.
1978) (addressing tax gross-ups given to key employees holding stock options, in disclosure
concerning a tender offer for stock, bonds, and stock purchase warrants, and stating, "Mlit is
not inconceivable that a reasonable shareholder might have considered the payments to the
option holders to be unfair preferential treatment, which should have been matched by an
increase in the tender offer price, and that such a consideration might have assumed
importance in his decision.").
336. The language quoted from Schott suggests the possibility that the plaintiff had a
cause of action because the puts rendered the financial statements materially misleading. A
close reading of the case indicates that the outcome was not dependent on the accounting
treatment or the accuracy of the financial statements. The case nowhere indicates that the
financial statements were, in fact, not prepared in accordance with generally accepted
accounting principles. That the auditors raised the question, by itself, would not support
granting summary judgment in favor of the purchaser. Thus, the case appears to support the
proposition that an undisclosed disparity of treatment of purchasers of securities in a single
offering-granting some rights not granted others-can be actionable on its own.
337. See generally Hal J. Liebowitz & Sarah Rothermel, Computer Company Limited
Partnership§ 6.01(b), in 2 DRAFING COMMERCIAL DocuMENTs SERIs 937, 1083-85 (Mass.
Continuing Legal Educ., Inc., No. 96-04.15, 1996) (providing a sample agreement that grants
only the managing general partner the authority to disapprove the substitution of an assignee
as a limited partner). Even when an assignee is not permitted to be substituted as a limited
partner, the assignment of the right to receive distributions would suffice to terminate risk of
liability of the assignor, absent future financial distress of the assignee.
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a specified amount at risk in the partnership. The put rights merely
made more likely a substitution of a type to which investors in the
plaintiff's position often will have no right to object. Nevertheless, the
338
court held that the materiality of the omission was "self-evident."
39
Additional authority is consistent with this conclusion
The "self-evident" rationale for materiality merits exposition.
Even if the granting of put rights to some purchasers did not decrease
the value of the plaintiff's investment, it might be relevant for purposes
of assessing the value of the securities being purchased. On that basis,
then, the omission could be considered material, that is, important to a
reasonable prospective purchaser. One might feel confident in the
propriety of the price of securities being purchased in an offering if
other, sophisticated individuals also make substantial purchases in the
offering at the same price.340 In such a circumstance, a purchaser can

338. See Schott, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9965, at *8.
339. See E.P. Seggos & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 11,167, 6 SEC Docket 51, 51
(Jan. 8, 1975) (finding a registered broker-dealer and one of its officers had violated antifraud
provisions of the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act by, inter alia, making material misstatements
concerning "the nature and composition of investors to whom ... stock would be sold");
First Detroit See. Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 10,943, 4 SEC Docket 689, 690 (Aug. 5,
1974) (relying, inter alia, on the fact that a salesman of a broker-dealer falsely stated a large,
well-known brokerage firm was buying securities the salesman recommended to customers,
in accepting an offer of settlement admitting the salesman had violated antifraud provisions
of the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act); Batkin & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 5709, available
in 1958 SEC LEXIS 269, at *30 (June 9, 1958) (referencing false statements by a brokerdealer's salesman, who claimed he had invested his own funds in the securities, in finding
that he willfully violated antifraud provisions of the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act); cf Abell v.
Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1116-17 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding ajury could conclude that
an offering document was materially misleading in creating a false impression that a
promoter had invested a substantial amount of his own funds in the issuer), vacatedon other
grounds and remanded sub nom. Fryar v. Abell, 492 U.S. 914 (1989).
340. See Banc One Capital Partners Corp. v. Kneipper, 67 F.3d 1187, 1193 (5th Cir.
1995) (quoting Svalberg v. SEC, 876 F.2d 181, 183 (D.C. Cir. 1989)); Svalberg, 876 F.2d at
183 ("The all-or-nothing provision serves not only to ensure that the issuing firm has
sufficient funds to complete its project, but also to give investors some reasonable indication
that they are paying a fair market price for their investment."); C.E. Carlson, Inc. v. SEC, 859
F.2d 1429, 1431, 1434 (10th Cir. 1988) (referring to a part-or-none offering in stating, "The
potential return of investor subscriptions, should the market judge the terms of the offering
unsatisfactory and not purchase the minimum number of shares, offers some protection to
investors. Some protection is afforded because the offering, if it is to succeed, must attract
capital in excess of that paid by each subscriber. Failure to sell the minimum number of
shares may reflect the market's judgment that the risk is too great (i.e. the potential return is
too speculative) or that the valuation placed on the offering by the issuer is too great."
(citations omitted)). See generally 17 C.F.R § 240.10b-9 (1999) (defining as manipulative or
deceptive the making of certain misrepresentations concerning required aggregate
subscriptions in all-or-none or part-or-none offerings); I HAZEN, supra note 6, § 6.3, at 364
(practitioner's ed., 3d ed. 1995) ("Mhe courts have recognized an implied right of action by
a subscriber to a securities offering who can show an injury as a result of a Rule lOb-9
violation.').
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"free ride" on the investigation made by the sophisticated individuals.
The issuance of put rights to some of those purchasers, at issue in
Schott, limited the risk of those selected purchasers in investing in the
limited partnership and therefore diminished the value of the
information conveyed by the fact that they purchased limited
partnership interests.
Administrative proceedings present consistent outcomes in
similar factual patterns, which have involved, in whole or in part,
various omissions from the plan of distribution, including failures to
disclose that "left over" stock was purchased by affiliates of a broker" ' that the
dealer in order to disguise the weakness of an offering,34
342
offering was not adequately coordinated, and that some shares in the
offering were given away. 43
This authority is compelling. Retail investors cannot practicably
investigate on their own whether stock to be sold in an IPO is properly
priced. They must free ride on the investigation of institutional
investors. No pejorative connotation is intended; the structure of the
federal securities laws is designed to allow uninformed investors to
rely on the integrity brought to the securities markets by competitive
forces operating in full and complete disclosure. These inadequately
disclosed restrictions impede the functioning of market forces. It is
341. See Mountain Pac. Inv. Co., Exchange Act Release No. 19,650, 27 SEC Docket
730, 730 (Apr. 4, 1983) (accepting an offer of settlement and issuing an order imposing
remedial sanctions).
342. See American Fin. Co., Securities Act Release No. 4465, available in 1962 SEC
LEXIS 632, at *19 (Mar. 19, 1962) (issuing a stop order) ("In view of the large number of
shares proposed to be offered in relation to the limited floating supply of shares, the apparent
lack of cohesiveness in the selling group and the absence of a prior market, the registration
statement should have identified the sellers and their relationships to each other ... and
should have disclosed that such distribution would not be coordinated or controlled by a
managing underwriter and that the selling group had not provided the contractual safeguards
for the protection of buyers and sellers usually provided in a conventional distribution. In a
conventional distribution of securities the activities of underwriters and other participants are
normally governed by underwriting agreements which provide a controlled procedure
designed to accomplish an orderly marketing of securities in accordance with the registration
and prospectus requirements and free from manipulative and fraudulent practices prohibited
by the securities acts." (footnote omitted)), stop orderlifted Securities Act Release No. 4538,
available in 1962 SEC LEXIS 153 (Oct. 2, 1962). But cf Application of Rule IOb-6 Under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to Persons Participating in Shelf Distributions,
Exchange Act Release No. 23,611, 36 SEC Docket 595, 598 (Sept. 11, 1986) (announcing an
SEC interpretation that, in the context of sales by shareholders under a shelf, restrictions on
purchasing securities applicable to persons engaged in a distribution would not apply to a
shareholder solely by virtue of contemporaneous sales by other shareholders covered by the
shelf).
343. See Stephen D. Replin, Securities Act Release No. 6939, 51 SEC Docket 826,
827-28 (May 28, 1992) (accepting an offer of settlement and issuing a cease and desist
order).
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difficult to imagine an investor finding this discriminatory treatment
unimportant. Finding material the failure to disclose these restrictions
on flipping is unavoidable.
D. ConclusionsConcerningDisparateTreatment
There is substantial support for the proposition that the
discriminatory enforcement of penalties for flipping renders
prospectuses misleading as a matter of law. A prospectus misleading
on this theory probably could not be remedied merely by disclosing
the discriminatory treatment of customers somewhere in the body of
the prospectus. It is inherent in the normal type of offering that the
same price is to be offered to all investors. That is a fundamental
aspect of a traditional offering. Any attempt to continue to reference
as a fixed price, firm commitment offering one that allows for price
differences, or arrangements equivalent to price differences, beyond
those contemplated by NASD rules, simply is not a fixed price
offering. "Curative" disclosures cannot suffice.
IV.

CONCLUSION

There are a variety of theories under which the prospectus
disclosure concerning restrictions on flipping can be challenged.
Some appear compelling. It is not at all clear, however, that there
is a sufficient incentive for a private plaintiff to assert these
theories. The unfettered remedy formerly provided by section
12(a)(2), essentially a one-year put in the case of a misleading
prospectus, is now subject to substantial additional limitations; the
loss causation defense recently added to section 12 may make this
disclosure violation one for which there is no practicably available
remedy.3" One has to suspect that the mysterious process by
which stock in IPOs is allocated would not reward an investor who
previously asserted this theory in a private cause of action, even if
successfully. It may be that this theory will be argued in some
future case by a private plaintiff as an alternative basis for relief.
Absent that development, however, it would seem that this
circumstance is one in which administrative enforcement is
warranted.

344. See supra text accompanying note 191.
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